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This thesis theoretically explores the concept of trust in music therapy with adolescents in a 
Norwegian child welfare context. By reviewing literature describing the Norwegian music 
therapy practice in child welfare and music therapy with adolescents in general, exploring 
different perspectives on trust and relating these to an interdisciplinary framework of trust, 
suggestions are made concerning how trust is built in the music therapy context.  
Music therapy can be used as a different setting in which the adolescents can create 
knowledge structures containing experiences of trust associated with adults and peers related 
to child welfare. The supportive nature of musical objects and the multifaceted role of the 
music therapist can enable new ways of relating which open up for trust. By listening to the 
adolescent’s voice and emphasizing their participation in determining the institutional 
structures of the music therapy sessions, they can use shared goals and values as a resource 
that enables trust. Repeated collaborative interaction in music therapy can build trust relations 
that move towards affect- and identification-based trust. People from the adolescent’s network 
can be invited to participate in the music therapy, giving opportunities to re-negotiate poor 





















1.0 - INTRODUCTION 
How is trust built in music therapy with adolescents in a child welfare context? Many children 
and adolescents placed in child welfare have experienced some form of neglect and have 
difficult emotions and feelings attached to this (Kayed et al., 2015), and some have experienced 
traumatic events which leave them at risk of developing traumatized reactions (Webb, 2005). 
It seems that positive experiences of trust may not have been the most prominent during the 
early years of these young individuals’ lives, and it might be understandable that some have 
difficulties trusting as they continue their lives. But, what is “trust?” Is it something we can 
give, take, create and destroy? Is it something inherently individual, something we adopt, create 
and share socially and through culture? What is the relevance of trust in music therapy? The 
aim of this thesis is to elucidate and explore these points, and explore the role of trust with 




The purpose of my master thesis is to explore the role of an interdisciplinary understanding of 
trust in relation to a sociocultural, culture-centered and community-oriented approach to music 
therapy within a Norwegian child welfare context. By reviewing select literature on music 
therapy in child welfare as well as on trust in music therapy with adolescents, how trust is built 
and the possible influence it has in music therapy in the context will be considered. I will then 
describe the main components of trust and elaborate on an integrative theoretical framework of 
trust that includes the notion of adaptive rationality. The ideas described will be used to explore 
the role of trust in music therapy in child welfare. Finally, the implications a deeper 
understanding of trust might have for music therapy with adolescents will be considered. 
Research questions will be presented in section 1.4.  
 
1.2 Background 
In accordance with what Wenger (1998) has written about social communities, my 
understanding is that we, throughout our lives, learn, find meaning and develop our identities 
in relation to the social and natural world we navigate and participate in, which in turn shapes 
how we interpret and act in the world. We are not “isolated individuals”, but are deeply 
interconnected with other individuals, groups, institutions and larger social systems, which we 
both influence and are influenced by. Interactions with others allow us to both shape the 
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situations we interact in and develop ourselves based on the experiences. This of course, 
involves trust as well, as I argue that trust is an essential component of relationships and 
fundamental to interpersonal interaction.  
 In Norwegian literature on music therapy and child welfare, a lot of focus recently has 
been aimed at the notion of participation (see for example Stige, 2005; Strandbu, 2011; Krüger 
& Stige, 2013, 2015; Stensæth, Krüger & Fuglestad, 2016). For example, Krüger, Strandbu & 
Stige (2014) found participation in music therapy to be helpful in becoming part of a 
community, as well as helping the child transition from child welfare institutions into 
participation in society. Personally, I have had the opportunity to work in a music therapy 
setting with adolescents in child welfare over the past three years, and developed an 
appreciation for participation in music therapy and how it can be valuable. However, one thing 
I started contemplating a while back is how trust plays into such participation, and in music 
therapy in general. One of my initial thoughts was whether it is different to trust someone 
“through music” compared to verbally. Are there some properties within music therapy 
activities that allow for trust to be developed differently, and if so what implications can this 
have in situations outside the music therapy? While there are mentions of trust in the literature 
regarding music therapy and adolescents / child welfare, it seems to be usually only mentioned 
in passing or dealt with implicitly, its role is not actually expanded upon very much. A common 
statement is that music therapy and the relations that develop within can be used to “build trust”, 
and that once trust has been established, many opportunities arise. But how does this build-up 
happen, and why? Scwhartz (2008) understands trust as the fundamental way very young 
children create meaning out of awareness, and explains that repeated experiences are necessary 
in which perceptual input is connected to responses from the child and finally mapped out as a 
way to structure the world. But how can we understand trust with older children and teenagers, 
such as in initial interactions in music therapy sessions? It seems reasonable that some degree 
of trust is necessary in order to allow for participation at all, and that trust must come from 
somewhere. In order to understand this, I use a broad, interdisciplinary theoretical framework 
of trust in an attempt to illuminate the role trust plays with respect to music therapy with 
adolescents in child welfare.  
 
1.3 Norwegian context of music therapy 
The Norwegian context of music therapy is commonly considered to have been founded by 
Even Ruud, who among other things helped establish the first music therapy education in 
Norway in 1978, theoretically developed a humanistic perspective of music therapy (Ruud, 
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2010), and critically inquired about the values and epistemological and ontological elements of 
music therapy (Ruud, 1998). He was considerate of the relationship and interplay between 
individual and community with respect to both health and the goals of music therapy. Stige 
(2002) described a culture-centred perspective on music therapy, which involves an interest 
and exploration in how individuals and communities are dependent upon and interact with each 
other, as well as the importance of culture as a resource for action. From this perspective, human 
interdependence is understood as a basis for autonomy, where participation in social 
communities such as society leads to the development of individuals’ different capacities. 
Rolvsjord (2010), with a similar critical approach as Ruud and Stige, developed resource-
oriented music therapy, which is highly collaborative and focuses on user-involvement. This 
perspective emphasises client strength and resources rather than being overly focused on curing 
a pathology and the reduction of symptoms, and is linked to other theoretical fields such as 
positive psychology, the philosophy of empowerment and salutogenesis (Rolvsjord, 2016). A 
third perspective that incorporates the thoughts and ideas described above, is the broad 
perspective of community music therapy (Ansdell & Stige, 2016). Ansdell and Stige (ibid.) 
characterize community music therapy as a movement rather than a model or approach, 
emphasizing social and community dimensions. Rather than just “adding community” to music 
therapy, the movement aims to rethink music therapy in terms ecological and sociocultural 
ideas, attempting to reconnect the individual music therapy with broader social and musical 
opportunities (ibid.).  
 Generally, in Norway music therapy in child welfare has been relatively scarce (Krüger 
& Stige, 2013), although it is growing. Krüger describes the practice describes the practice in 
Bergen, Norway, stating that the sessions usually occur on a weekly basis, both in individual 
and group formats (ibid.). Activities emphasize resources and opportunities for participation, 
in line with the perspectives described above. Through participation in musical activities, the 
adolescents are supported through learning to play instruments, meet peers and have 
opportunities to be in dialogue with adults. Music therapy can also involve participating in the 
performance of concerts or shows, where they can convey music or lyrics to an audience. This 
creates opportunities for identity development, new social experiences and new possible 
courses of action. The music also allows for a bridge to be built between their specific child 
welfare environment and the local society surrounding it, for example through a performance. 
The adolescents can receive guidance on how to use and participate in public cultural programs 
outside of the child welfare system, and musical activities can thus be related to school, 
recreational activities and every-day life. Skills and abilities that the adolescents have learned 
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in the music therapy context, can potentially be applied to new situations - one might wonder 
then, if the same type of transferability is true with experiences of trust in music therapy. 
Further, workers at the teenagers’ child welfare institutions can be invited to participate at music 
therapy workshops with the adolescents as well, giving teenagers opportunities for positive 
experiences with adults. This new way of relating to one another might provide opportunities 
to develop new relational schema, where trust can be built through a new musical framing of 
the situation in which new courses of action are possible (schemata will be explained further in 
section 3.2). If the relationships between adolescent-adult in the institutions is strained, posing 
a challenge to trust and communication, music therapy can potentially provide fresh arenas for 
the adolescents and adults to develop healthier relationships and trust towards one another.  
 A human rights perspective is relevant to the practice of music therapy with children 
and adolescents (Curtis & Vaillancourt, 2012). The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) has been ratified in Norway, which involves an obligation to uphold the rights and values 
the convention is built upon (Krüger, Bolstad & Stige, 2016). In terms of participation, article 
9 recognize the child’s right to participate and let their voices be heard in decisions regarding 
them and their parents, while article 31 describes their right to opportunities where they can 
freely participate in cultural life and arts, where the state has an obligation to encourage the 
provision of such opportunities (United Nations, 2009).  Article 3 of the CRC places a primary 
emphasis on considering “the best interests of the child” in all actions concerning children 
(ibid.). This is a somewhat vague concept, but I argue that it is essential that the child’s own 
voice is of vital importance in determining what these best interests are. I claim that in order 
for the child’s voice to be heard, trust is fundamental. As adults working with children, we need 
to trust that they can make choices and decisions in their own lives, and that they possess an 
indispensable source of knowledge in terms of their own needs. However, children also need 
to be able to trust the adults around them, so that they feel safe and secure in actually voicing 
their thoughts, feelings and interests. This involves balancing out the power structure between 
children, adults and the systems around them, so that they do not become controlled passive 
actors, but active participants in their lives with strengths and resources they can utilize. I argue 
that music therapy can provide an arena where such a focus can be placed, and trust can be 
built. Similarly, Follesø (2006) posits that it is insufficient to simply amass general and 
theoretically informed knowledge regarding children, but that youths have to be asked about 
their experiences and thoughts, and that their competencies and experiences need to be trusted. 
Krüger and Stige (2015) state that there is a need to produce more research that can help 
professionals develop strategies which can structure and facilitate capacities related to listening 
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to each individual child in order to let their voices be heard. My hope is that this thesis on trust 
and music therapy in child welfare can be a contribution towards this.  
 
1.4 Method 
This thesis is theoretical, using a literature-based investigation similar to what Stige (2006) used 
when exploring the notion of participation. As Stige notes, the approach relates to both what 
Bruscia (2005) described as “integration,” which is an integrative approach to theory building 
which is based on several existing theories, and philosophical inquiry described by Aigen 
(2005). According to Aigen, philosophical inquiry involves four procedures. These are (1) 
clarifying terms, (2) exposing and evaluating underlying assumptions, (3) relating ideas as 
systematic theory, and (4) using arguments as primary means of inquiry. In chapter 2, music 
therapy with adolescents and child welfare will be investigated, in order to uncover assumptions 
about trust. In chapter 3, trust as an interdisciplinary concept will be investigated, first exploring 
different types of trust from a psychological, sociological and economic perspective. These 
ideas will then be bridged together using the notion of adaptive rationality in a broad integrative 
theoretical framework developed by Rompf (2014). The different literature and ideas will be 
compared and related to each other, in order to deepen my understanding of the role trust has 
with respect to music therapy in child welfare. As this aims to explore the Norwegian context 
of music therapy in child welfare, the literature I use will predominantly be concerning the 
Norwegian context. Regardless, the literature I use is the main data of this thesis, and the main 
method is the critical reflection around and comparison of the literature.  
When doing research, it is important (many argue necessary) for the researcher to describe 
their epistemological perspective (Murphy & Wheeler, 2016). This concerns what assumptions 
and understanding one has about knowledge, a “theory of knowledge.” Each epistemology is 
based on its own set of assumptions with respect to the nature of the relationship between the 
researcher and the research subject(s) (ibid.). The theoretical perspectives, methodology and 
methods of research studies reflect these assumptions. In research, by sharing one’s 
epistemological perspective explicitly, it allows the reader to understand findings more deeply, 
and be more informed if critically challenging the findings and the processes involved in getting 
to them. With this in mind, the three philosophical orientations of social constructionism, 
critical theory and hermeneutics will be put forward that help inform my understanding. 
 Social constructionism is similar to the perspective of constructivism, which 
understands meaningful human reality as constructed by individuals through both their 
interpretations and interactions with other individuals and the world (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 
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2009). A principle difference is that social constructionism considers interpretations and 
meaningful reality not as something purely produced through an individual mind, but as inter-
subjectively co-constructed by individuals with a shared sociohistorical language and context 
(Crotty, 1998; Murphy & Wheeler, 2016). The subjective and transactional elements of 
interpersonal relations allow meaning and reality to manifest. From this perspective, 
“interaction” is a fundamental element in understanding both social and natural phenomena. 
People interact dialogically through language, and both communicate and transact meanings 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). The “self” is considered socially constructed, and both emerges 
in and is shaped by social interactions and relationships with others. The importance of culture 
is emphasized, because it molds us and influences the way we interpret and feel (Crotty, 1998), 
which affects how we interact and leads to us to “communicate culture” with others. This relates 
to the concept of socialization (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), which is the process of 
internalizing socially shared knowledge (i.e, culture), such as social norms and values, as well 
as individual identity development. As such, constructivist epistemologies are useful for 
exploring meanings and meaning-making processes (Murphy & Wheeler, 2016), I believe they 
are relevant for the topic of trust. 
 Critical theory, sometimes referred to as critical hermeneutics, is characterized as an 
interpretive approach, and also has a focus on critically disputing concrete social realities 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). It goes against assumptions that the conditions in society are 
inevitable and natural, and instead postulates that asymmetries of power and special interests 
strongly influence historically created societal conditions, and that it is possible to bring radical 
change to these conditions (ibid., p. 144). A dialectic view of society is maintained, and any 
social phenomenon must always be considered with respect to its historical context. In relation 
to child welfare, I find this an important perspective as the power structures between children 
and adults can sometimes be very asymmetric, which can lead to children not being able to 
voice their needs, thoughts and feelings. There is also a “risk” that workers within the child 
welfare system unnecessarily assume an “expert role”, where they have a disproportionate 
amount of power compared to the adolescents they interact with. Additionally, there is a 
conceivable risk that adults may hold more power in choosing when to end a relationship, and 
that the adolescents are passively sent around through the child welfare system according to the 
needs of the system and the adults’ themselves. 
 Scwhandt (2001) describes hermeneutics as the “art, theory and philosophy of 
interpreting the meaning of an object” (p. 155).  In research, the hermeneutic epistemology is 
related to what Heidegger (1927/1996) called hermeneutic phenomenology and the 
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philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer (1976/2008). According to Heidegger and Gadamer, 
individuals are always situated in both a specific and historic context, which influence how we 
perceive, understand and experience the world (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). The interpretive 
nature of the research process has to be acknowledged when trying to describe structures and 
important phenomena in human experience, as the researcher will inevitably be informed by 
their own preconceptions, prejudices and worldview (ibid.). In other words, the subjectivity of 
the researcher will influence how phenomena are understood in the research process. 
 
With this in mind, these are the research questions for the thesis:   
1. How has trust been understood in music therapy with adolescents?  
2. How can trust as a mental phenomenon broadly be understood?  























2.0 - MUSIC THERAPY WITH ADOLESCENTS 
In this chapter, I will begin with presenting a few pieces of literature that mention and generally 
deal with trust in music therapy. I will make initial notes of what seems to be important to the 
build-up of trust, and consider the rationale behind emphasizing trust in work with adolescents. 
Subsequently, I will present literature that focuses on music therapy specifically in a Norwegian 
child welfare context, again making some initial assumptions concerning the role of trust as I 
understand it in the literature and exploring a few different approaches to music therapy work 
in a Norwegian child welfare context, such as individual and group sessions.  
 
2.1 Music Therapy and Trust  
McFerran (2010) highlights the importance of trust with respect to different aspects of music 
therapy. She explains that during an initial meeting with the music therapist, teenagers have a 
need to determine whether the therapist is trustworthy, and so tend to “hold back” and mask 
themselves until proof is provided. McFerran argues that the only way the music therapist can 
meet this demand without any prior interaction history, is to offer a “clear sense of purpose, 
and a willingness to get things done.” (2010, p. 51). In order to do this, she argues, the music 
therapist needs to offer a “real” presentation of their self that is consistent and authentic.   
McFerran (ibid.) suggests that music therapists have “three primary ways of being with 
the adolescent client”, associated with different theoretical orientations. These are to “stay 
calm” (psychodynamic orientation), “go with it” (humanistic orientation) and “stay one step 
ahead” (behavioural orientation). Again, the important point is to be authentic and consistent, 
and as long as the music therapist is clear and respectful of the adolescent, it doesn’t matter 
which stance is adopted. Importantly, she notes that if the music therapist is consistent, but 
flexible, trust will build more quickly. A hypothesis that can be gleamed is that being consistent 
and clear leads to a greater sense of predictability, which might indicate trustworthiness.  
McFerran (ibid.) describes the use of songs in music therapy, and explains that they can 
represent deeply personal aspects of the teenager. She argues that through the use of songs, 
adolescents might share information and feelings they haven’t shared elsewhere, “masked” or 
contextualized by the music in order to make their communication tolerable. If this sharing of 
personal aspects is consciously intentional on the part of the teenager, this might be a way for 
them to “test the waters” for trustworthiness, informed by the music therapists’ response. If the 
adolescent is not fully aware that they have shared a vulnerable part of themselves through the 
song, then it seems important that the music therapist acknowledges this and sensitively 
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supports them in order to avoid violating the trusting act the adolescent has offered, even if it 
was done without conscious intent. McFerran explains that through offering to truly listen to 
and accept the music of the adolescent, trust can be established and defensive barriers reduced.  
McFerran posits that teenagers very quickly make a judgment of whether they trust an 
available adult, and so adults should feel able to ask directive questions. She explains that 
adolescents should be trusted to make decisions and refuse to discuss a topic if they feel 
uncomfortable, though keeping in mind that persistent questioning in response to resistance can 
lead to a negative relational outcome (ibid.). In other words, adolescents should be trusted to 
have control over their own choices, and the music therapist shouldn’t be scared of being 
(sensitively) direct and honest. This can be related to Epstein (2007) and his thoughts 
concerning child-parent relationships, who argues that children should be offered more trust as 
they develop their identity on their path to becoming an adult, and that the emotional connection 
between child and caregivers can suffer a fundamental breakdown if the child’s ability to make 
decisions in their own lives aren’t acknowledged. He argues that the adolescent-parent bond 
should be strong and accepting rather than controlling. Exerting such control on their lives can 
be understood as a distrust towards the teenagers, where they are not entrusted to make choices 
in their own lives. This seems to indicate that a notion of power is relevant to building trust and 
developing relationships, also in the context of music therapy. 
 Though not specifically geared towards adolescents, Kenny (1989), focusing on musical 
improvisation with clients, claims that the “merging of the therapist’s and the client’s aesthetic 
fields in the musical space results in trust” (p. 74). She explains that this establishes the “field 
of play”, a relational space consisting of musical experimentation, imitation, communication 
and modelling, as experienced through musical improvisation. It seems then that shared musical 
experiences can be used to frame an interaction in such a way that trust can be built through a 
dialogue of one’s musical identities. 
 When working with adolescents with severe disorders related to affect and contact 
regulation, which can be relevant in the context of child welfare, using a particular musical 
object can be valuable in managing to build a therapeutic relationship (Smetana, 2017). 
Smetana analysed three cases in order to understand how music can be used in a therapeutic 
dyad as a “third element”. The findings indicate that the key factors are that there are typical 
characteristics inherent in the musical objects, that they can contain a variety of meaning and 
that they are important to the adolescent. They provide a sense of security, and can function as 
a foundation that development of exploration, contact regulation, mentalization and 
symbolization can build upon. In fact, the musical objects can become the foundation for the 
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music therapy sessions themselves (ibid.). This can be related to Ruud’s (2013) study of how 
people use music in their everyday life to improve their health and well-being. One of the 
findings were that music can potentially function as a safe and positive “self object”, and is 
something that the individual can trust and interact with that supplies the strength to work 
through challenges. These two studies seem to indicate that the musical objects can provide 
something safe and consistent to hold on to, and that they can help an individual deal with 
challenging situations, such as going to therapy or tolerating social interactions. 
 From a community music therapy perspective, Stige and Aarø (2012) found that music 
is useful providing adolescents with individual and social support, and facilitating the voice of 
the child (see also Krüger, 2012). Music (understood in a broad sense) can be used as a flexible 
and multifaceted resource in order to facilitate various forms of participation. Participation is 
here understood as more than simply “the action of taking part in something.” Stige (2006) 
presented the following definition of participation:  
“Participation is a process of communal experience and mutual recognition, where 
individuals collaborate in a socially and culturally organized structure (a community), 
create goods indigenous to this structure, develop relationships to the activities, 
artefacts, agents, arenas, and agendas involved, and negotiate on values that may 
reproduce or transform the community” (Stige, 2006, p. 134, emphasis in original).  
Stige explains that the collaboration in music therapy usually involves some means of music-
making contextualized by complementing activities. Examples of created goods can be musical 
products or psychological insights, which help develop relationships and contribute to the value 
negotiations. It doesn’t seem farfetched to consider that trust can also be part of created goods, 
which might nestle into psychological insights (new positive experiences regarding trusting 
others), or be observable in the musical products. We might also consider how the negotiations 
of values in the context affect trust, in that shared values (which we can also call social norms) 
regarding what is deemed appropriate and wanted in the setting can influence the actors’ 
disposition to trust one another in interactions. If an openness to share creative ideas is 
considered a value in the setting, that might prompt an individual to feel secure in voicing their 
thoughts as they trust that the other participants will be accepting and respectful, potentially 
based on the community’s internalization of the value alone. Stige’s mention of mutual 
recognition and cooperation in his definition of participation also involves a notion of both 
power and empowerment, which implies that these are concepts that should also be considered 
when thinking of trust.   
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2.2 Music Therapy in Norwegian Child Welfare 
In a Norwegian context, Krüger (2012) explored the themes of children’s rights and music in 
his doctoral thesis interviewing 15 adolescents living under institutional care; the following 
four findings were uncovered:  
1)  Related to their life and upbringing in the child protection institution, many 
adolescents have experienced serious challenges.  Examples are moving, unstable 
social relations, poor quality communication with adults, and stereotyping by others. 
2) Music can be valuable in how they organize and make meaning of situations in their 
everyday life, and a resource that helps adolescents process feelings, thoughts and 
social participation experiences.  
3) Music, in a community music therapy workshop setting, can be a resource that helps 
structuring participation.  
4) Music can be used to help create communities where people can meet and use music 
as a communicative means to share important messages with others, while also 
giving opportunities to dispute established positions of power.  
 The first finding seems to indicate a lack of trust between the adolescents and the adults around 
them, where, perhaps in part due to power differences, proper communication has been difficult 
to establish and so opportunities to build trust have been limited. Further, due to being moved 
around a lot without much say of their own, trust in the child welfare system as a whole might 
have been negatively affected, which might influence how they judge new people they 
encounter, especially if we take into account McFerran’s (2010) point that adolescents are very 
quick to judge whether an adult is trustworthy or not. We might consider that if a new adult is 
associated with a system in which the adolescent lacks trust, that does not bode well for the 
development of their specific trust relationship.   
 The second and third findings in Krüger’s study indicate that music in itself can be 
something the adolescents can trust, similar to the ideas of Smetana (2017) and Ruud (2013). 
Perhaps by having such a trusting relationship with a musical object or setting, a social situation 
can be framed in such a way where interaction with others in whom trust is less certain is made 
easier. The musical structuring of a situation and the “rules” that that provides can provide some 
clear courses of action for the adolescents (e.g. “we are going to play music together, only rule 
is play as fast as you can”), which if nothing else might allow them to trust the specific 
situation’s musical rules, and then potentially through shared social and musical experience 
lead to trust being built between participants. The fourth finding can be taken to indicate that 
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this is the case, as the musical dimension provides a foundation upon which a community can 
develop, and can be trusted to convey meaningful messages to others. This can be related to the 
creation of shared values in a community (Stige, 2006) mentioned previously, which in 
themselves might be a source of trust participants can depend on. By starting with some sort of 
trust in the music, relationships and new values can be created and negotiated that build upon, 
support and develop this initial trust.  
 Mandal and Bergset (2016) describe experiences from using music therapy as an 
integrated part of aftercare measures for children and adolescents living in foster care. A 
rationale for their work is based on that many adolescents who live in foster care experience 
having a fragmented network around them, and that it is important for people who work with 
the adolescents to try to find ways to connect these different parts of their lives. Theoretically, 
it is informed by Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological perspective his understanding of human 
development. He defines development as “[…] a lasting change in the way in which a person 
perceives and deals with his environment.” (p. 3). This emphasizes the importance of the 
context(s) the individual is situated in, and the interaction between individual and their 
environments. As Mandal and Bergset argue, when understanding development like this, it 
becomes important to be build knowledge about what contexts the individual is a part of. In 
Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological model, the environment surrounding the individual is 
conceived of as a set of different context systems or “nested structures”. The first and innermost 
is the microsystem, which is the immediate setting the developing individual is situated in. This 
includes situations where the individual has face-to-face interactions with others, such as in the 
home, classroom, and friend groups. Second is the mesosystem, which is the relationships 
between the individual’s different microsystems, such as between the home and school. In other 
words, the mesosystem concerns the interactions between the different microsystems (Mandal 
& Bergset, 2016). Third is the exosystem: this system involves other people and places which 
the individual does not usually interact with directly, but where the social processes that occur 
influence their microsystem.  This can for example involve the status of the caregivers’ 
workplaces, or school administration. Finally, fourth is the macrosystem which contains the 
most remote set of people to the individual, but which still has strong influence; governments, 
cultural values, laws etc. Bronfenbrenner (1979) posits that the individual’s development 
occurs through mutually influential interactions between the individual and the different 
systems they are a part of.  
 Mandal and Bergset (2016) focus on the mesosystem, explaining that since the 
adolescents’ often experience a fragmented network of microsystems, this means that there 
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might be a lack of contact between their individual microsystems. The authors argue that the 
music therapist can potentially assume the role of a mesoagent, which means that they are part 
of several of the microsystems of the adolescent and can work towards strengthening the 
connection between the different microsystems, such as biological/foster family and school. In 
their case illustration, the authors describe an experience where the adolescent was part of a 
concert performance, which her biological family, foster family different groups of friends, 
teachers and child welfare case worker were present for. Many of them met for the first time, 
and the situation gave opportunities for the different microsystems to build bridges and bonds 
between them, creating more coherency in the adolescent’s network. In addition, the people in 
the different microsystems might have experienced a new side of the adolescent’s identity 
which they have not encountered in the context they usually frequent together.  
 Describing how a music therapist can work as a meso-agent for an adolescent in foster 
care, Mandal and Bergset (2016) mention that music can be used as a unique medium for 
communication, which mirrors the findings in Krüger’s (2012) study. They describe that music 
can be used to help the youths regulate their feelings, and help them experience stability and 
safety. Here too it seems that music as an object or setting can be used as something the 
adolescent can trust and find support in. The authors suggest song-writing as a useful activity 
as well, where the songs can be used as containers for difficult experiences and feelings, which 
they can use in order to potentially build relationships; for example, if past experiences with a 
biological parent have been challenging, using a song can be a softer and more comfortable 
way to communicate this with the parent, which might give opportunities to repair broken 
bridges and build trust in other relationships. In this way, music created in one microsystem 
can be used as a resource in another. This example indicates that there might be a fairly strong 
trust relation between the adolescent and music therapist in that the former feels comfortable in 
sharing difficult thoughts and working together to place them into a song. It also points to a 
trust in the song itself to be used as a means to confront someone important to the adolescent 
with a difficult topic.  
 Mandal and Bergset (2016) do also note that music therapy might not be the correct 
choice for all adolescents, stating that it is important for the professional to try to meet the 
adolescent in one of their fields of interest and use this as a foundation to build a relationship. 
This emphasizes the importance of listening to the child’s voice, and respecting their needs, 
opinions and motivations. I argue that this is important for the building of trust as well, making 
sure that the adolescent plays a main role in the relationship with the music therapist. As Mandal 
and Bergset argue, “one size never fits all”, and some adolescents might specifically not want 
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different parts of their microsystems to interact with each other. By attempting to “force” 
something on the adolescent, be that a certain activity or facilitating unwanted interaction 
between micro-systems, it seems likely that trust between the adolescent and music therapist 
will become more difficult. In other words, a collaborative approach between the adolescent 
and music therapist seems more favourable in terms of building trust.  
 Strandbu et al. (2016) describe “music theatre” as a setting that can be used when 
working with adolescents in child welfare, empirically informed by interviews with teenagers 
that have participated as well as observations made from rehearsals and performances over the 
course of 15 years. This music therapy work in a music theatre setting has a focus on identity 
development, recreational activities and working towards opportunities of further participation 
in other contexts.  
 The conducted interviews indicate that several of the adolescents have struggled with 
being heard and understood by adults, and that they have been confused or not properly 
consulted about decisions regarding them, contrary to what the CRC described as part of the 
children’s rights. Strandbu et al. (ibid.) also relate their work to article 8 of the CRC, which is 
the child’s right to identity. The authors explain that the teenage years are especially challenging 
in terms of identity development, where questions regarding family, important others and 
thoughts about one’s own future are actualized. Teenagers within the child welfare system may 
have difficulties answering all these questions. This is illustrated in a study of 400 adolescents 
in Norwegian child welfare institutions by Kayed et al. (2015), where workers in the child 
welfare institutions describe that 55% of the adolescents in the study have struggled to make 
friends outside of the institutions due to frequently being moved around the system, which has 
also led to 21% of the adolescents facing difficulty in terms of attachment.  
 As mentioned above, several of the teenagers find it challenging to be understood and 
taken seriously by the adults and system around them. To “take someone seriously” can be 
defined as considering the other’s arguments, thoughts and opinions as assertions that have to 
be looked further into (Skjervheim, 1996). Relating to this definition, Strandbu (2011) defines 
participation as “involvement in and communication and interaction with children, where the 
goal is to achieve an understanding of the child’s experiences, expressions and opinions” (p. 
81, my translation). In other words, there is an interpretive aspect to realizing a child’s right to 
participate, in that individuals in the child’s environment need to be determined and motivated 
with respect to understanding the child’s perspective (Strandbu, 2011; Strandbu et al., 2016). 
This involves trusting the child as competent and knowledgeable in terms of their own lives, 
and places a demand on the people around the child to both act and be trustworthy, so that they 
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are someone the child can open up to. Realizing children’s right to participation also involves 
helping them to express themselves so that they are taken seriously (Strandbu et al., 2016). The 
authors argue that a music theatre context can be a place where such opportunities for 
development and understanding can be made available and worked on.  
 The music theatre form in itself involves all types of theatre that have music as a 
foundational element, such as musicals, cabarets, opera, dance-dramas etc. (ibid.). 
Theoretically, as a child welfare measure it is informed by Boal’s (1979) method of forum 
theatre and Freire’s (1970/2005) “Pedagogy of the Oppressed.” The latter is a theory that 
involves a notion that dialogue and communication, using language and arts as means, can be 
valuable in developing equitable relationships characterized by respect (Strandbu et al., 2016). 
Powerlessness and suppressive life situations can, through dialogue, be transformed into 
constructive protest and opposition. In the music theatre used by Strandbu et al. (ibid.), the life 
experiences of the adolescents are used as a starting point to create different scenes, lyrics and 
performances, partly as an attempt to highlight and challenge established asymmetrical power 
structures. An attempt is made to help bridge the gap between people who for different reasons 
struggle to communicate with each other, using music and arts as a means to foster 
communication and understanding, which can potentially establish healthier relationships and 
build trust.   
 Strandbu et al. (2016) note that the most important inspiration they have taken from 
Freire and Boal are that the music theatre participants are equal actors, engaged in a 
collaborative work-process spanning over a longer course of time. It is important to facilitate 
dialogue both between the participants and to actors in other relevant communities, such as 
child welfare institutions. Participation in the music theatre involves continued interaction 
between adolescents, peers and adults who meet, talk and do something together, with a mutual 
goal of collaboratively creating something. There are planned weekly rehearsals, as well as 
occasional excursions, concerts and revues. Both musical and personal goals are worked on, 
for example by musical practice or practicing speaking your mind, as well as experience 
speaking in larger groups and cooperating with other teenagers to solve concrete tasks. The 
adolescents assume different roles and are given different responsibilities (which can change 
over time), based on collaborative and dialogical interactions (Krüger & Strandbu, 2015), where 
the expression of ones needs and opinions is considered a shared value in the collective. As the 
music theatre has lasted for a long period of time, there are both participants who have only 
recently joined while others have been there for years. The authors explain that some of the 
adolescents with more experience and time in the group sometimes assume a “mentor role” for 
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the newer participants, and that former participants often visit in order to meet people they have 
made friendships with through participation in the group. The group can be thought of as a 
place of security of comfort, where the participants take care of each other and structure the 
context in a way where the actors can gain experiences of trust and the effects of 
trustworthiness. The resultant friendships can be a resource for the individuals even after 
participation in the music theatre has ended.  
 Strandbu et al. (2016) break down the work-process of the music theatre into four 
phases, which are not strictly start-stop sequential but can overlap. They are not driven by 
predetermined rules and procedures; importantly, their progression and content is defined in 
collaboration with the participating adolescents (Krüger & Strandbu, 2015).  
 First is the planning phase. This involves mapping out needs and figuring out practical 
solutions and possibilities, such as which resources (people, places and material) are available. 
This phase also involves finding out which adolescents are participating and how the musical 
activities are carried out.  
 Next is the preparing phase. Here the adults and the adolescents get to know each other 
and work on establishing relationships and trust. Concretely, this occurs by visiting the 
adolescent’s homes or recreational settings. The needs of each adolescent are mapped out, and 
the actors discuss how these needs can be met through participation in a music theatre. Strandbu 
et al. (2016) emphasize the importance of explaining the context and goals of the music theatre, 
providing some predictability about the setting which the adolescents can consider before 
actually entering into the group. Once the adolescents come together, different activities are 
used so the actors can start getting to know each other. Examples are association games, role-
play and improvisation theatre. Activities focus on exploring different topics they are concerned 
with, and voicing individual and collective experiences. The adolescents’ individual 
experiences are used as a means to participate, both shaping future activities and creating bonds 
between the actors.  
 Third is the work phase. Ideas that sprung out of the previous phase are developed, and 
transformed into musical objects such as scripts and lyrics. This occurs with the help of a 
professional writer, who prepares drafts based on the teenagers earlier input. These drafts are 
then reviewed by the teenagers, who for example comment on whether the texts accurately 
describe what they meant. While these texts are collaboratively worked on, the participants also 
work on music that can fit the texts, do band rehearsals and prepare for the performance (the 
participants switch between being on stage and in the audience). The importance of the 
audience’s role in supporting and helping the performer feel secure on stage is emphasized, 
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giving them a chance to build some experience being on stage in a safe environment. 
Individuals from the adolescent’s other microsystems also come by rehearsals occasionally, 
such as friends and family. Strandbu et al. (2016) state that helping the teenagers feel 
comfortable on stage and developing a sense of ownership of the musical product is crucial in 
making a performance that is credible and touching to the audience.  
 A subset of the previous phase is the realization phase. This is about focusing on the 
environment, local community and society at large. Here, the performance is actually held for 
an external audience. invited audience members are not random, as the audience and their 
response and feedback are an essential part. This is often geared towards friends, family, and 
people within the child welfare system, both to create a safe setting for the performance and 
sharing new parts of their identity, while also communicating important messages and 
experiences. The performance can be seen as a way for the adolescents to invite other actors 
into a dialogue.  
 Last is the evaluation phase, which takes place after the performance has been given. 
The group participants give feedback on the work process and the performance, voicing what 
has worked well and what could use improvement. These evaluations can occur both through 
individual conversations and group discussions. Feedback from friends, family and child 
welfare workers are also important, creating a dialogue between the participants and audience. 
And important point here is that the music theatre’s leader takes care to make sure the feedback 















3.0 - DEFINING TRUST 
A vast amount of research has been done on trust, and a plethora of different definitions exist. 
The definitions are usually very specific to the research subject at hand, which often leads to 
challenges comparing findings across different studies. Due to this, I have chosen to rely on the 
ideas developed in a broad interdisciplinary framework of trust (Rompf, 2014), which attempts 
to bridge the vast amount of different perspectives and ideas from psychological, sociological 
and rational choice approaches. The reason for this will hopefully become clear throughout 
chapter 3. First, I will present the objective structure of trust, which are elements that most trust 
researchers agree upon. Following that I will describe the more contentious subjective 
experience of trust, which trust research seems to have struggled to collectively define. 
Subsequently, Rompf’s solution will be presented, involving a notion of adaptive rationality 
and dual-processing modes.  
 
3.1 The objective structure of trust 
A trusting act requires actors as constituents of an interpersonal trust relation. Note, while trust 
is commonly meant to mean something between to individual actors, it can also refer to a 
relation between a person and other groups, collectives, social institutions etc. In a trust relation, 
the individual and purposeful actors are the primary subjects of trust (Rompf, 2014), here 
referred to as trustors. The primary objects of trust are other actors, organizations, groups or 
institutions, referred to as trustees in the following.  
Rompf (ibid.) notes that while cases of interpersonal trust between two actors don’t 
necessarily directly explain how trust works on a larger scale, such relations of dyadic trust 
make up the micro social building-blocks which constitute a larger system of trust. In order to 
understand other social phenomena, such as social integration at large, it is necessary to 
sufficiently comprehend dyadic trust relations (ibid). This is because if we conceive of trust as 
a mental phenomenon, its only level of emergence is from the individual micro-level. Due to 
this, the concept of trust will in the following focus on these building blocks, and thus be limited 
to trust relations between two individual actors. Trust in groups, collective actors, and in the 
economic and political system as a whole, are classified as “system trust” in order to 
differentiate such types of trust from the concept of interpersonal trust (ibid; p. 32). System 
trust isn’t irrelevant, as such trust can be the starting point for certain types of interpersonal 
trust, but this will be explored further in section 3.3.  
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The trust relation refers to the special relation between trustor and trustee. A trust 
relation is always made up of a three-part relation manifested as “A trusts B with respect to X” 
(Hardin, 2002, p. 9). Here, A and B refer to trustor and trustee respectively, while item X refers 
to the content of the trust relation. Trustor, trustee and the content of the trust relation are the 
main elements of interpersonal trust relations. In terms of music therapy, this can for example 
be that the adolescent trusts the music therapist specifically with regards to teaching them how 
to play guitar. 
 
Defining the Basic Trust Problem 
As a prerequisite for a trust relation, the trustor has to be confronted with a certain decision-
making problem when deciding whether to trust. Rompf (2014) presents two different sets of 
actions the trustor can decide to choose from when dealing with a basic trust problem. The first 
set’s actions leave the trustor vulnerable to the trustee’s response. Control over resources or 
events are transferred to the trustee, whose future actions will decide outcomes of loss or gain 
for the trustor. The trustor cannot precisely predict the trustee’s actions or rely on the external 
enforcement to negate the risk. The second set of actions eliminates potential losses, 
vulnerability and risk altogether, as a transfer of control is not made and there is no opportunity 
for the trustee to decide the outcome. An adolescent could for instance choose to share 
something difficult and personal with the music therapist (thus leaving them vulnerable to the 
music therapist’s response, but potentially being supported and cared for if a trustworthy 
response is given), or they could choose not to and not risk anything, but eliminate all 
possibilities of gain too.  
When a trustor chooses an action from the first set, we can say that A trusts B, which is 
referred to as a trusting act. This trusting act establishes the trust relation. If the trustor chooses 
an action from the second set, we can say that A distrusts B, and the observed action is distrust. 
Assuming that A chooses to trust B with respect to X, then all actions B can take which do not 
harm A and serve to achieve the potential gain and utility increase for A, are part of the content 
of the trust relation X. B is considered trustworthy when they fulfil A’s trust by choosing such 
actions.  
Lewis and Weigert (1985) define the behavioural content of trust as choosing a risky 
course of action through which one can see trust demonstrated. Since the trustor has to transfer 
control over select resources or events to the trustee while not being able to know for sure what 
the final outcome will yield, Luhmann (2000, p. 27) interprets the choice of a trusting act as a 
“risky investment”. However, do we always choose to trust? A behavioural approach considers 
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an observable trusting act as the trustor’s rational choice among actions, based on sufficient 
expectations of a trustworthy response (Coleman, 1990). However, Mayer et al. (1995) 
maintain that there is a fundamental difference between trust and trusting behaviours, in that 
having a willingness to assume a risk is not the same as actually assuming that risk. Therefore, 
trust is often conceived of by authors as a psychological state (Kramer, 1999) or a mental 
phenomenon (Lahno, 2002), and intrinsically connected to subjective affect and knowledge. 
Thus, choosing to perform a trusting act only displays some observable outcome, while when 
actually trusting someone, the trustor accepts the trust problem’s inherent vulnerability (Rompf, 
2014). Rompf offers an understanding of trust as a two-step process, in which trust begins with 
the subjective definition of the situation (interpretation), which both leads to and prepares for 
the eventual choice of an action in the trust problem. This will be expanded upon later. 
 
Social Uncertainty 
A trust problem involves some degree of social uncertainty (Kramer, 2006). If we assume that 
a trustor has perfect knowledge of all of the trustee’s motivations, intentions and preferences, 
then the trustor can perfectly predict if the trustee will respond with a trustworthy action. Trust 
would be unnecessary in such a deterministic context, although we would still be able to 
observe trusting acts. If the trustor has zero information there is no opportunity for trust, and 
the choice of a trusting act would be left to blind chance. This means that as a concept, trust 
refers to a situation in between these two extremes, where there is neither a state of perfect 
knowledge or of complete ignorance (Simmel, 1992).  
A trust problem always has a degree of asymmetric and imperfect information in a trust 
problem, then. Asymmetric in the sense that while the trustor might not have perfect knowledge 
of the trustee’s characteristics, this knowledge is available to the trustee. Imperfect meaning 
that the trustor typically knows something about the trustee that can be used in the trust problem. 
As the information is not perfect, we can say that a trustworthy response can only be predicted 
with some probability – such a “subjective assessment of the probability of an event” can be 
referred to as an expectation (Rompf, 2014, p. 37), and we will adopt that understanding of 
expectation in this thesis.  
Social uncertainty stems from both the imperfect information concerning the trustee, 
and the fact that the trustor has no control over the outcome once trust has been chosen. Social 
uncertainty results from being dependent upon the decisions of other actors, and can be avoided 
in a trust problem by choosing to distrust. Social uncertainty can never be avoided when a 
trusting act has been chosen by a trustor, which means it is inherently a part of a basic trust 
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problem (Rompf, 2014). This is in line with what many researchers have defined as one of the 
objective core elements of trust problems – the cocktail of potential opportunistic actions with 
imperfect information and social uncertainty (Dasgupta, 1988; Gambetta, 1988; Luhmann, 
2000; Hardin, 2001; Kramer, 2006). When a trustor chooses to trust, the social uncertainty is 
bypassed or “ignored”, in a way that seems beyond the expectations that could come from 
reasoning and experience on their own (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
 
Vulnerability 
Since trust will always include a transfer of control of resources from the trustor to the trustee, 
there will always be an objective vulnerability on the part of the trustor (Deutsch, 1960). If there 
is no vulnerability present, then the outcome is irrelevant trustor and trust is unnecessary 
(Mishra, 1996). Conversely, Heimer (2001) found that vulnerability increases along with the 
stakes in an interaction. We can also speak of an individual subjective experience of 
vulnerability (Rompf, 2014). This aspect encompasses a qualitative element of individual 
subjective experience, manifested as an internal response to the incentive structure. Trust can 
be considered as a psychological state which is made up of the “intention to accept 
vulnerability”, given favourable expectations of the behaviour or intentions of another actor 
(Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395). This means the trustor is conscious of the vulnerability inherent 
in a relevant trust problem, but opts to go for the risky choice of a trusting act.  
 
3.2 The subjective experience of trust 
Most theorists agree upon the fact that trust can be considered as a fundamentally psychological 
state, regardless of what other features are essential (Kramer, 1999). However, theorists have 
offered many suggestions for the characteristics of this psychological state of mind (Bigley & 
Pearce, 1998). Cognitive conceptualizations of trust tend to focus on the trustor as a rational 
actor aiming for the achievement of maximum utility when faced with a trust problem – key 
elements are what expectations, beliefs and intentions the trustor uses. This perspective views 
the trust phenomenon as something completely cognitive, where the trustor utilizes existing 
knowledge in order to form an unemotional expectation which leads to a corresponding rational 
choice to trust or distrust (Luhmann, 1988; Rousseau et al., 1998). When viewing trust as 
situated in the category of knowledge, Hardin (2001) notes that in instances where the trustor’s 
rational choice in the interaction was incorrect, that simply results in a need for the existing 
knowledge of the trustor to be updated.  
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Viewing trust from a psychological perspective, McAllister (1995) found that a unique 
basis for trust can be formed through the emotional bonds between two individuals, while Jones 
and George (1998) found that moods and emotions can influence the subjective experience of 
trust, and that they can indicate the quality and presence of trust in a relationship. Burke and 
Stets (1999) argue that trust can create a sense of commitment, confidence and security, as well 
as induce attachment to the trustee.  
It seems that there are processes that work interrelatedly through affective, cognitive as 
well as behavioural aspects with respect to trust. Rompf (2014) notes that such a proposed 
dimensionality of the trust construct is similar to that of attitude research, which has explored 
and explained attitudes through the three dimensions of cognition, affect and behaviour 
(Breckler, 1984; Chaiken & Stangor, 1987). Lewis and Weigert (1985) offer an explanation as 
to why trust research varies so greatly in how it perceives the subjective experience of trust, by 
saying that the distinct manifestations of the affective, cognitive and behavioural dimensions 
need not necessarily be equally present at all times. Some trust relations might be influenced 
more greatly by one of the dimensions; intimate relationships might be more affective in nature, 
while more foreign situations may be more influenced by the cognitive dimension. Rompf 
(2014) explains that while this may be the case, all three of the dimensions are present at all 
times in the experience of trust; be that through the knowledge structures and corresponding 
expectations which are part of the cognitive dimension, moods, feelings and emotions which 
constitute the affective dimension, or the behavioural intention to act on trust. He also adds that 
the normatively and culturally structured environment is referenced implicitly, and that all of 
these elements merge to become a unique experience of trust. 
 
Expectations 
The trustor will utilize the knowledge they have available to create a group of assumptions, 
beliefs or expectations considering the probability that the trustee’s future actions will be 
beneficial to the trustor’s interest, or at least that the outcome won’t be harmful (Robinson, 
1996). Many authors have placed an emphasis on the trustor’s positive expectations concerning 
the outcome of a trusting act (Deutsch, 1958; Rotter, 1967; Coleman, 1990; Hardin, 1993; 
Robinson, 1996; Gambetta, 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998; Kramer, 1999). Rompf (2014) labels 
and summarizes these expectations, beliefs and assumptions as the trustor’s expectation of 
trustworthiness. Gambetta (1988) explains that the trustor requires their expectation of 
trustworthiness to exceed a subjective threshold value in order to perform a trusting act, 
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dependent upon both individual dispositions and situational circumstances. In other words, an 
expectation that surpasses the subjective threshold will be considered a favourable expectation.  
The Danish philosopher and theologist Løgstrup (1956) considers us humans to be born 
with a natural trust in our surroundings, and thus that we initially have a generally favourable 
expectation of trustworthiness. He bases this assumption upon a belief that people are deeply 
dependent upon one another due to a mutual influence on each other’s lives. He argues that as 
we grow older, we learn to adjust our expectations and trust accordingly based on experience, 
but that children have not necessarily had the same opportunities for such an adjustment. He 
further elaborates that if children are met with breaches of trust and a rejection of their own 
trustworthiness early in their lives, this can be of major consequence for the child, and greatly 
impact their expectation of trustworthiness and willingness to trust as they grow older (ibid). 
We can elaborate by connecting this to Rotter’s (1967) definition of interpersonal trust, which 
considers trust a favourable expectation concerning the reliability of another actor’s promise, 
oral/written statement or word. Rotter offers a distinction between expectations that are specific 
and generalized. While the specific expectations are comprised of experiences and an 
interaction history with a specific individual, the generalized expectations are more abstract and 
consist of more generally similar experiences in a larger range of situations with different 
actors. In any given situation, Rotter argues that we use both our specific and generalized 
expectations when faced with interpreting the interaction partner. We could hypothesize that 
since our social networks very early in our lives might be limited in size, dramatic or traumatic 
interactions with important specific individuals might have far-reaching implications for our 
generalized expectations as we grow older, in line with Løgstrup’s thoughts. This carries 
implications if we consider our expectations to provide some sort of general theory regarding 
what we can expect in terms of trustworthiness. If our expectations tell us not to trust on a 
general level, we could be in danger of never involving ourselves socially and might risk social 
isolation.  
Four major trustee characteristics have been described which relate to positive 
expectations of trustworthiness: benevolence, competence, integrity and predictability (Mayer 
et al., 1995; McKnight et al., 1998).  These characteristics are assumed to notably influence 
both the perceived trustworthiness and resulting level of interpersonal trust, and are considered 
to be “antecedents of trust” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 727). Benevolence is understood as how 
much the trustee cares about the trustor’s welfare, and involves a trustee’s personal orientation 
towards the trustor. Competence refers to the skills or ability the trustee has that actually make 
fulfilling the content of the trust relation possible. Rompf (2014, p. 44) illustrates this by saying 
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that while A trusts B with regard to X, that might not be the case with Y, because an expectation 
of competence is specific to an activity or context. Integrity refers to how consistent the 
trustee’s actions have been in the past. This relates to how honest, truthful and open the trustee 
has been, and whether or not what they say matches what they do (Hosmer, 1995). Finally, 
predictability concerns the trustors evaluation of the trustee’s personality, and an assessment of 
whether they act predictably or not. In other words, can the trustor predict that the trustee will 
behave and act consistently enough to warrant a trusting action? Taken together, these four 
characteristics can explain a large part of perceived trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995).  
Rompf (2014, p. 46) presents five micro- and macro-sources of trust-related knowledge 
based on several theoretical accounts: 
(1) Specific expectations – Includes knowledge of the characteristics of the specific trustee, 
as well as information concerning the particular and unique trust problem 
(2) Dyadic embeddedness of the trust relation – Knowledge that concerns experience taken 
from reciprocal, repeated interactions between the specific actors 
(3) Network embeddedness of the trustor and trustee – Entails knowledge about the relevant 
social mechanisms of learning, control and reputation 
(4) Institutional embeddedness – This consists of knowledge tied to internalization of social 
roles, cultural practices, norms related to trust on one hand, and knowledge of various 
safeguards the institution might have, such as regulations, contracts or guarantees 
(5) Generalized expectations – The individual disposition to trust, as well as aspects like 
moral principles, values and stereotypes.  
Basically, the trustor has a broad range of tools at their disposal which are utilized when 
establishing expectations in a trust problem. Trust is defined by cognitive accounts as the 
intention and willingness to be vulnerable, given sufficiently favourable expectations of 
trustworthiness when met with social uncertainty (Mayer et al. 1995, McKnight et al. 1998, 
Rousseau et al. 1998, Rompf, 2014).   
 
Risk and ambiguity  
Risk and ambiguity seem to be very similar concepts, as they both refer to the subjective 
perception of an objective uncertainty. But there is a difference: faced with a situation carrying 
a risk, the decision maker is able to subjectively precisely predict the probability that events 
will occur (Rompf, 2014). The actor has a certain expectancy of risk in the situation, and we 
can understand risk as “the perceived probability of loss which originates from the choice of an 
uncertain event” (ibid., page 48).  While the actual occurrence of a risk-related event in a given 
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situation might be uncertain, the actor has an unambiguous expectation of it. If I walk around 
with my eyes closed, I can expect that I might bump into something with an exact subjective 
likelihood, though it doesn’t necessarily need to occur – my expectation of risk is unambiguous.  
When confronted with ambiguity on the other hand, attaching any precise probabilities 
to events is impossible. Our expectations are imprecise, and we don’t have enough information 
or knowledge available to utilize in order to sharpen them. Situations of ambiguity refer to 
imprecise expectations concerning uncertain events, as opposed to situations of risk which 
contain certain expectations (ibid.).  
As previously noted, Lewis and Weigert (1985) explained a trusting action as a 
bypassing of social uncertainty, seemingly exceeding whatever expectations come solely from 
reasoning and experience.  An interesting solution to this is Möllering’s (2001) concept of 
suspension. According to Möllering, suspension removes situational ambiguity by making 
available knowledge temporarily certain, allowing the actor to define expectations as either 
favourable or unfavourable in order to transform ambiguity into a manageable risk. Similarly, 
Luhmann (2000, p. 30) argues that when trusting, external uncertainty is replaced by an internal 
certainty through “overdrawing information.” These notions seem to add a somewhat irrational 
element to a cognitive conceptualization of trust, through which trustors can surpass their 
rational expectations (Rompf, 2014). When thinking about why the trustor would go through 
such a process of suspending ambiguity, we might infer that it is to both protect the self from 
the ambiguous social uncertainty, as well as give opportunities to move forward and perform 
actions when dealing with unfamiliar situations.  
 
Normative dimension of trust 
A common characteristic of the normative dimension of trust is that the trustee’s compliance to 
values, moral principles and other social norms forms the basis of their motivation for 
trustworthiness (Hardin, 2003). The normative dimension helps us understand the importance 
of where the trust relations are situated, meaning their embeddedness in social systems, the 
social norms within these systems, as well as the societal values in general (Rompf, 2014). The 
normative dimension of trust implies that there is a connection between the individual, 
institution and culture, and that we must consider trust both from an individual and collective 
perspective, as it is thoroughly imbued in both (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Ripperger (1998) 
explains that in order to protect trust and trustworthiness within a social system, behaviour 
needs to be regulated by the social establishment of internal mechanisms which promote the 
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internalization of social norms and moral values, unless mechanisms of external enforcement 
(such as contracts) can be used.  
Rule-based trust is based on a shared understanding of appropriate behaviour according 
to the relevant system of rules (Kramer, 1999). This understanding assumes that both actors in 
a trust relation each have an established value system and an implicit understanding of the 
cultural practices and socially shared norms (Rompf, 2014). Rule-based trust is group specific, 
and depends on how the social system structures the normative rules. For rule-based trust to be 
relevant, the actors need to be socialized into the same social system and have internalized the 
same set of social norms. As Lewis and Weigert (1985) summarize: “In groups for which trust 
exists as a social reality, interpersonal trust comes naturally and is not reducible to individual 
psychology” (p. 976). The rules, roles and routines of the institutional framework in which the 
trust relation is situated can give enough reason for choosing a trusting act, because they give 
meaning to action by representing socially shared expectations for the individuals within the 
collective (Rompf, 2014).  
 
The affective dimension – emotions and feelings 
Many researchers point out the importance of an affective dimension as well (Lewis & Weigert, 
1985; Rempel et al., 1985; McAllister, 1995; Jones & George, 1998; Schul, 2008; Lount, 2010). 
The consensus seems to be that both cognitive and affective dimensions are necessary for 
understanding trust, as trust can both be thought of and felt.  
We can make a theoretical distinction between moods and emotions when 
understanding the affective dimension. Emotions are tied to particular affective reactions one 
has to a specific event. Emotions tend to be clear, intense and short-lived (Rompf, 2014). Moods 
on the other hand are less clear-cut, not quite as intense and generally last longer, and the 
specific cause for its emergence not usually immediately apparent (ibid).  Both moods and 
emotions tell us how we feel about the situations we find ourselves in, which also includes our 
interactions with others.  
Our affective states can be a source of information we utilize heuristically when making 
decisions, defined by Schwarz and Clore (1983) as the “feeling-as-information” paradigm. Put 
simply, a complex decision problem can be solved by considering “how we feel about it”, where 
the answer guides our decision-making. Rompf notes that affective states have a direct 
influence on individual’s judgments when they let their feelings inform decision-making, and 
an indirect influence when they change the individuals processing strategies, and so influence 
“what comes to mind.” (Rompf, 2014, p. 57).  
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Jones and George (1998) found that by experiencing either positive or negative 
emotions, the trustor can be influenced in whether they deem the trustee trustworthy or not. In 
other words, their emotions can inform their interpretation and judgment of the other actor. This 
can be connected to cognitive appraisal theory, which basically refers to how people make sense 
of events through a personal interpretation and “appraisal” of the situation utilizing relevant 
available knowledge (Yap & Tong, 2009). Cognitive appraisal theory suggests that emotions 
are the outcome of a series of cognitive processes which are activated if the individual 
recognizes the current situation as being relevant to personal wellbeing (Rompf, 2014, p. 58). 
Maier (2009) notes the importance of the interpretation of a given trust problem, and argues 
that a plethora of different emotional reactions can emerge simply from the initial interpretation 
– emotions can be activated through a cognitive appraisal of the situation’s meaning. Maier 
adds that the particular context where the trust problem is embedded can determine the arousal 
of any specific emotion. The perceived status of the trust relation, the trustor’s knowledge of 
the trustee, and the particular set of expectations associated with the situation are reflected in 
the trustor’s emotional reaction.   
Moods and emotions can also influence “what comes to mind”, which impacts how we 
interpret and form expectations of a situation. One might suppose that being in a happy mood 
makes you more inclined to trust and vice-versa with negative states. This has been shown 
empirically, and induced emotions can influence trust even when they are unrelated to the 
trustee (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). For example, the recognition of faces has been found to 
trigger automatic emotional responses (Phelps, 2006) which are consequential for evaluations 
of trustworthiness (Winston et al., 2002).  
Bless and Fiedler (2006) found that positive moods make us more likely to rely on 
existing knowledge structures (a top-down processing style), while negative moods push us to 
rely on external information (a bottom-up processing style). Forgas and East (2008) 
demonstrated that negative moods can increase an individual’s scepticism, reduce their 
likelihood to interpret interpersonal communication as being truthful, and improve their ability 
to accurately detect actual deception. Research has also found that positive moods might result 
in less trust, as individuals with a top-down processing strategy are more likely to recognize 
situational cues that indicate distrust (Lount 2010). Interestingly, if individuals are made aware 
of their affective state and its origin, its influence on judgments and decision-making is 
neutralized (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005, Lount 2010). Summarized, both emotions or moods 
are important when thinking of the subjective perception of trust, as they can directly or 
indirectly influence the judgments and decisions we make in a trust problem. 
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According to Lewis and Weigert (1985), strong affective bonds between actors can 
develop into being the predominant part of the trust in mature trust relations. It can be described 
as a state of positive affect associated with feelings of emotional security and confidence, where 
the trustor does not even consider that the trustee will breach trust (McAllister, 1995; Lahno, 
2001, 2002; Rompf, 2014). An affective state of trust can be imagined like a perceptive filter 
that immediately impacts the preferences and beliefs of the trustor (Lahno 2001). To understand 
this, we can use the idea of relational schemata, which Baldwin (1992) relates to how we 
process social information. Relational schemata are an explanation for how people frame their 
social relations, based on the idea that individuals develop cognitive structures through social 
interactions which represent “regularities in patterns of interpersonal relatedness” (ibid., page 
461). They can be both general or specific to a relation. These schemata also contain typical 
affective responses, which can be automatically triggered in the form of associated moods and 
emotions if the relational schemata between two particular actors is developed through repeated 
interactions (Andersen & Chen, 2002). Basically, the more developed and mature the trust 
relation and its associated relational schemata is, the more likely trust is dominated by affective 
elements. The authors found that in some cases, developed specific relational schemata can be 
applied to actors and contexts even where the specific significant other is not present. If a new 
person is eliciting interpersonal cues which match the specific relational schemata (the way 
they listen, meet one’s gaze, habits, attitudes, gestures etc.), that can contribute to the specific 
relational schemata being deemed as applicable in the situation by the trustor, as well as 
activating the associated relational self (ibid., page 623).  
Essentially, affective states are an important dimension of the subjective experience of 
trust. They inform the trustor of the status and nature of initial and ongoing trust relations in 
specific situations (Rompf, 2014). When trusting, a trustor chooses to perform the trusting act 
either because their expectations are sufficiently favourable and stable, or their corresponding 
affective state make the choice to trust “feel right”. Emotions and current mood can influence 
whether the trustor interprets the trustee as trustworthy, but also be directly activated through 
the trustors cognitive appraisals in a particular trust problem. The degree to which the trust 
relation is developed and matured can influence whether the choice of a trusting act is rooted 
more in affective or cognitive elements. Essentially, both feelings and rational thinking are 
fundamentally important in trust relations.  
  
	 -	33	-	
3.3 System trust and institutional trust 
System trust concerns social systems or abstract institutions as objects of trust (Rompf, 2014). 
It manifests and is made sustainable through the ongoing and confirmatory experience of the 
system’s functioning, illustrated for example through the stability of monetary systems. System 
trust is maintained by the individual participants’ trust in the functioning of the system as a 
whole (Luhmann, 1979). It relates to an institution’s global features which both structure and 
control interaction in social settings, such as its main goals, structure, legitimacy, operation and 
sanctioning potential (Rompf, 2014). System trust has implications for the system’s functioning 
and stability, and a lack of system trust leads to the social system’s deterioration and decline 
(Lewis & Weigert, 1985).  
Institutions can function as a basis for the formation of expectations in a trust problem, 
by providing relevant rules and social norms. Rompf (2014) describes institutional trust as the 
“manifestation of system trust in a particular interaction” (p. 68). Luhmann (1979) argues that 
system trust is dependent upon the individuals’ assumption that other participants in the social 
system also equally trust in it, and can be thought of as “trust in trust”. High levels of system 
trust can be described as ones’ expectation that the social system provides effective regulation 
and structure to the other participants through institutional rules, norms and procedures, and 
sanctioning measures. Institutional trust can emerge if this perception of system trust is 
sufficient (ibid). High levels of system trust can be thought of as providing a sense of security 
and stability to the individual as they interact within the social system. Rompf (2014) 
summarizes the distinction between institutional and system trust by explaining that 
institutional trust refers to the trustor’s specific interpretation of the institutional rules in relation 
to the trustee’s action, while system trust refers to assumptions about whether the rules are 
generally valid, applicable and enforced. 
Over time, as interactions and experiences structured by institutional trust within the 
social system comply with our assumptions and expectations, system trust is strengthened. This 
illustrates how larger systems of trust are made up of building blocks constituting of dyadic 
trust relations. Using the medical system as an example, Giddens (1990) argues that specific, 
interpersonal trust relations with medical professionals plays a large role in developing trust in 
the system as a whole. An assumption that can be made here is that the same is true for specific 
interpersonal trust relations with music therapists or other child welfare workers in shaping trust 
in the child welfare system. All these dyadic trust relations form the building blocks of system 
trust for a relevant institution, and provide generalized expectations for trust relations between 
actors who are otherwise anonymous to one another – such as initial doctor-patient meetings. 
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Trust relations are embedded into a social context, and both individuals and social systems 
influence the framework of interaction in which trust occurs, which means that trust cannot be 
understood as exclusively belonging to either (Luhmann, 1979, p. 6)  
 
3.4 Objective structure to subjective experience 
As illustrated above, trust is complex and multifaceted. In order to properly understand it, there 
is a need to examine the concept from several disciplinary approaches. I will now briefly outline 
the main points taken from the psychological, sociological and economic approaches. The 
claims from these different approaches might seem to initially be conflicting. 
 
3.4.1 Psychological development – learning theories  
Can trust be learned? When a trustor faces a trust problem, the information they have available 
shapes their expectation of trustworthiness. The trustor interprets and uses this stored 
knowledge together with both affectual information and any immediate situational impressions 
to form expectations of trustworthiness (Rompf, 2014). Generalized expectations are created, 
or “learned”, from a large number of past experiences, which the trustor uses to inform their 
immediate impressions of a trustee when there is no specific knowledge available. Expectations 
of trustworthiness are informed by actual interaction history between the actors, where they 
have had the opportunity to build a relationship and learn about each other. Individuals can 
learn social rules, norms and roles, which they can also use to inform the choice of a trusting 
act. Essentially, the psychology of trust is constructed through experience (Hardin, 1993).  
 When understanding how the structure of knowledge is determined and organized, we 
can use the concept of “schema” (Rumelhart, 1980). Schemata are mental representations of 
the world that let us recognize what we already know, and we use them as interpretive schemes 
of reality to abstract the typical from specific experiences as well as to understand context. They 
function as theories about reality, and guide us when making new experiences (Baldwin, 1992). 
The totality of the schemata in a given moment construct the internal model we have of any 
given situation (Rumelhart, 1980). Greenwald and Pratkanis (1984) defined identity as a 
collection of self-related schemata, while Fiske (1993) defined stereotypes as socially shared 
schemata that include the prominent traits of a social category. Schematic knowledge can be 
“updated” if we encounter experiences that contradict them, but as long as experiences or 
situational cues do not deviate too far from the available knowledge, people can use a process 
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of “familiarization” to accommodate for unfamiliar events by discerning their “distance” to 
internalized schemata (Möllering, 2006b) 
 When schemata indicate that a situation is familiar and known, this allows for routine 
behaviour which relates directly to the interpretation process (Schütz & Luckmann, 1973). 
Routine is interrupted if a situation appears problematic if stored knowledge cannot be used to 
define it properly, which leads to relevant knowledge being brought into consciousness in order 
to rationally attempt to understand the situation. If routine is left uninterrupted, we interpret 
automatically (ibid.). From this we can infer that perhaps trust-related knowledge could also 
potentially be applied routinely when in familiar contexts with well-known individuals.  
 We can understand the concepts of learning, familiarization and routine as important 
dimensions of socialization (Rompf, 2014). Through socialization, individuals learn and 
internalize society’s basic rules, norms and values, and develop schemata concerning what is 
typical and irregular, usually from significant others in their lives. Simultaneously, the 
individual learns and generalizes a multitude of socially shared schemata through experience, 
which they use to add meaning to typical situations, action sequences, actions, roles, routines 
and technical skills (Rompf, 2014, p. 84). This socially shared knowledge influences an 
individual’s perception, interpretation, planning and action (D’Andrade, 1995). Schematic 
knowledge of typical situations, or frames, make the main goals of a given situation clear, and 
allow the social definition of a situation to be reciprocal between actors (Lindenberg, 1992).  
 This relates to trust as it is rooted in specific information, for example about the trustee, 
dyadic/network embeddedness, the normative culture surrounding the trust relation (rules, 
norms, roles, values) and generalized expectations. As this suggests the possibility of trust 
becoming routine and habitual behaviour, the processes of both socialization and learning can 
be considered important in terms of conditions for interpersonal trust.  
 
Basic trust and attachment theory 
Erikson (1950) described the idea of basic trust being formed in infants and children, which 
involves the creation of a “basic sense of faith in the self and the world” (p. 80). According to 
Erikson, the formation of basic trust occurs within the first two years of life, is preconscious, 
and involves a vague sense of safety and consistency regarding the relationship between the 
child and its caregiver(s). It is rooted in the child’s experience of the environment as secure and 
capable of providing general satisfaction of its needs. It relates strongly to the caregivers’ 
availability, reliability and predictability in response to the child, and is primarily an emotional 
concept. It is part of the child’s identity development, influences social interaction, and provides 
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a general orientation of perceiving others as being trustworthy or not. A criticism here is that it 
portrays the child as a passive actor, and many argue that the child is an equal participant during 
this development (Warming, 2013).  
 Bowlby (1969) similarly describes the early affective bonds children have with their 
parents as fundamentally important, and emphasizes their impact for adult life. His research 
spurred the development of attachment theory, which studies and explains how attachments are 
formed and influence relationships throughout the course of life. Primary questions are how 
and why children make emotional attachments to their caregivers, and if/how this influences 
how relationships are developed and maintained throughout life. These attachment bonds are 
grounded in the infant’s need for safety and protection. This early feeling of faith and security 
in a caregiver’s reliability and responsiveness comes with the creation of one of the first 
relational schemata the child develops (with their caregiver(s)). If a child has a secure 
attachment with their caregivers and basic trust, this reflects an inner sense of security in the 
child in which everything in the environment appears typical and expected; thus, we can 
understand basic trust as related to a routine, taken-for-grantedness of reality.  
 
Individual dispositions and traits 
Several authors argue the idea that learned trust-related knowledge can transform into stable 
individual dispositions and personality traits (Erikson, 1968; Rotter, 1980; Hardin, 1993, 2002). 
Building on this, theories which focus on differences in trusting behaviour in an inter-individual 
sense have been proposed, jointly called theories of dispositional trust (Kramer, 1999). These 
theories have a central assumption that aspects within people make them more or less likely to 
trust others. Rotter (1980), in a social learning perspective, describes trust in terms of a 
generalized expectation of other people’s trustworthiness, meaning that an individual develops 
a general expectation through their prior experiences involving trust. This generalized trust 
functions as a reference for the individual when trusting unfamiliar others, and its influence 
increases the more novel the situation is to the trustor. If the situation is familiar, the generalized 
expectations can be replaced by specific ones depending on how developed the trustor-trustee 
relationship is (ibid.).  
Hardin (1993) describes a similar perspective, arguing that early-life experiences like 
and neglect can deeply impact the individual’s capacity to trust, represented by a “general 
optimism about the trustworthiness of others” (p. 508). This is especially consequential for low-
trust types, as they cannot gain any utility from trust as they avoid trusting interactions, which 
also diminishes the possibility to learn and update their general expectations of trustworthiness 
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through positive trust experiences. Empirical studies exploring the difference between low- and 
high-trust types find that the latter are more likely to notice trust-related information and 
correctly judge another’s trustworthiness (Yamagishi et al., 1999), are able to adjust faster in 
situations that show signs of untrustworthiness (Yamagishi, 2001), and are more trustworthy 
and honest in terms of their behaviour and more positively viewed by others (Rotter, 1980). 
However, Gill et al. (2005) found that individual dispositions to trust can only be used to predict 
trusting intentions in situations where the trust-related information concerning a trustee is 
ambiguous. If the situational cues clearly point to the trustworthiness of a trustee, these become 
the basis for judging their trustworthiness rather than the individual dispositions and traits of 
the trustee. While internal factors like traits and dispositions seem relevant in interpersonal 
trust, their effect in a given situation may be limited when considering external factors.  
 
Dynamic Models of trust development 
Researchers have also focused on how trust develops and changes in relationships over time 
(Lewis & Weigert, 1985; McAllister, 1995, Jones & George, 1998; Lewicki et al. 2006). 
Through a series of repeated interactions in an ongoing relationship, multiple trust relations are 
developed and specific trust-related knowledge generated. There is a focus on how 
expectations, intentions and affect regarding the other evolve as the relationship progresses, 
and an assumption that the trust relations become reciprocal. Lewicki et al. (1998) claim that 
relationships have a “bandwidth” and “richness.” The relationship bandwidth concerns which 
specific contexts of interpersonal relating the interpersonal trust is relevant to, where the 
bandwidth will be broader if trust is experienced across several contexts and very narrow if the 
interpersonal trust is only valid with regard to one specific context. The relationship richness 
concerns how detailed knowledge is across the bandwidth, meaning how much information the 
individuals know about each other in relation to the various contexts.   
 From this perspective, trust is generally considered to be low at first and building up 
over time through experience (Lewicki et al., 2006). The increase in trust is typically fuelled 
by interactions that are mutually satisfying (Rempel et al., 1985) If the outcomes of a trust 
interaction is successful, this is associated with positive emotions and moods, making the 
experience of trust favourable and warranting a continued relationship and building of trust 
(Jones & George, 1998. Essentially, trust creates more trust. 
 Lewicki and Bunker (1995) proposed that trust evolves through the stages of calculus-
based trust, knowledge-based trust and identification-based trust. When considering the choice 
of a trusting act in calculus-based trust, the trustor calculates the gains and losses the trustee 
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will have if they choose to be untrustworthy, and uses this as a guide. In knowledge-based trust, 
the actors have gotten to know each other and stabilized their expectations through repeated 
interaction. Rather than focusing on assessing the consequences of specific actions like in 
calculus-based trust, the trustor focuses on the trustee’s qualities and characteristics (Lewicki 
et al., 2006). Jones and George (1998) classified these first two stages of trust as conditional 
trust, which they argue is adequate to enable most social interactions. The last stage of 
identification-based trust springs out of a mature relationship where the actors have developed 
a mutual identification with each other accompanied by strong affect. The actors have 
developed shared values and common goals, and move towards being motivated by maximizing 
joint outcomes rather than self-interest (Lewicki et al., 2006). Trustworthiness is unquestioned, 
as the actors have learned through joint experiences to be confident in the other’s values (Jones 
& George, 1998). Jones and George (ibid.) consider this stage as unconditional trust, where 
uncertainty is completely removed and mutual attachment is increased. The other’s motivation 
is now attributed to intrinsic motives as well as an established shared social identity (Rempel 
et al. 1985). This stage is an example of real “blind” trust, where trustworthiness is taken for 
granted.  
 These models of trust development help us understand how specific relational schemata, 
favourable expectations, affect and attachment are developed, which are important sources of 
trust-related knowledge. They also illustrate how trust moves from calculating subjective 
perception of trust towards a state of affect and security. 
 
3.4.2 Sociological perspectives – functions of trust 
Sociological approaches to trust focus more on trust as a relational concept, and places the 
socially embedded trust problem in a broader institutional and cultural context (Lewis & 
Weigert, 1985). This approach explains how trust-related knowledge is socially predefined, as 
it is internalized through socialization that occurs in a context with a specific social stock of 
knowledge. This approach also explores how social institutions influence and shape the way 
trustors solve a trust problem, for example through the use of trust-related knowledge such as 
the institution’s social roles or norms. This trust-related knowledge can lead to trust problems 
being solved through what is considered “appropriate” in the situation.,  
This perspective considers trust an element in a fundamentally social human reality, and 
relates trust to the social context it is embedded in. The relational features of trust are 
emphasized. Trust is conceived of as an element of multiple actors in the form of dyads and 
groups rather than isolated individuals (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Trust can be understood as 
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having mainly a sociological function, since it is unnecessary unless in social relations. The 
need for trust stems from the complexity of the social world individuals interact in (Luhmann, 
1979), and so trust can be understood as a means for the individual to reduce social uncertainty 
and be able to act. The importance of trust in social interactions will lead to it commonly being 
institutionally protected, to make sure that rule-based trust is valid and applicable for the 
individual, and that system trust can be maintained. Sociological approaches demonstrate 
another way trust can emerge unconditionally, through actors’ routine application of 
institutional rules which stem out of situational normality and structural assurance (Rompf, 
2014). 
 Another important focus for sociological approaches is how trust works in regard to the 
social systems is originates and is sustained in. It promotes socializing, participation with others 
and enriches networks of interpersonal ties as well as encouraging tolerance and acceptance of 
strangers (Sztompka, 1999). Fundamentally, trust is considered as a primary element of 




The strategies trustor’s employ to solve a trust problem is influenced by the social 
embeddedness of the trust relation, through the availability of resources and the costs of action, 
and activates relevant cultural schemata such as norms (Heimer, 2001). The relationships 
between the trustor and trustee, trusting parties and other actors in a social system, actors and 
the relevant social system itself are all part of the social embeddedness (Rompf, 2014). 
Individuals are regarded as embedded in networks of personal relationships, which means that 
actions always occur in a social context. Trust and trustworthiness are influenced by 
mechanisms of learning and control (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Control involves 
opportunities for reward and punishment in response to a trustee’s actions, while learning 
entails opportunities for the trustor to get information about the trustee, either through past 
interaction, from third parties through reputation or through the surrounding institutional 
structures. We can differentiate social embeddedness into dyadic, network and institutional 
embeddedness (Rompf, 2014).  
 Dyadic embeddedness involves the repeated interactions between two individuals. It 
refers to a situation where the trustor and trustee already have a history of interaction, or where 
it is likely they will interact again in the future. There is a dimension of power to these trust 
relationships, and only a certain amount of power asymmetry can be endured before inevitably 
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leading to distrust (Farrell, 2004). In continuing relationships with developed emotional 
attachments where resources have been invested by both actors, power is less likely to be very 
asymmetrical, and the relationship is valuable to both. If there is a power difference, the actor 
with less interest in continuing the relationship possesses more power, since they have less 
incentive to be trustworthy and to be considerate of the other’s interests. On the other hand, 
since the actor with less power knows the other has no incentive to be trustworthy, neither do 
they, and such big power differences are likely to result in a mutual distrust (ibid.).  
 Dyadic embeddedness involves the opportunity for learning about the other’s 
dispositions, motives and intentions, which can be used in order to form and stabilize specific 
expectations. Repeated interactions have the potential to increase the relationship bandwidth 
and richness, as well as promoting mutual attachment and shared relational schemata being 
developed. It can also lead to trust becoming routine action (Endress, 2002).  
 Network embeddedness involves third parties in relation to both the trustor and trustee. 
These third parties can be a source of information or means of sanctioning, and allow for 
reputation mechanisms to be relevant; reputation is important as a source of trust knowledge, 
as well as social capital for the actors (Coleman, 1988). Third parties use reputation to inform 
trustors of a trustee with respects to trustworthiness, and can regulate the trustee’s behaviour 
by rewarding or punishing them based on reputation-information within the network (Rompf, 
2014). Consequently, failing trust is costlier for the trustee, while the trustor has the option to 
damage reputation or seek out alternative trustees in the network as a response to 
untrustworthiness, effectively increasing the trustor’s power.  
 Institutional embeddedness refers to the cultural-normative setting that surround a trust 
relation. These institutions are a source of trust-related knowledge and structure action (ibid.). 
Institutions are here understood as socially shared expectations involving sanctions in regard to 
an obligatory and pre-established rule (Esser, 2000). Examples of institutions are social norms, 
which are associated to either external or internal negative sanctions. Institutions can create a 
familiar foundation for trust, as well as structurally protecting trust between unfamiliar 
individuals. They reduce complexity by giving socially shared information about typical 
behaviour and action in a social setting. Social roles, for example, enable trust through the 
expectations that are associated with specific social roles, rather than on any specific 
information concerning trustee characteristics (Kramer, 1999). As long as the trustor 
sufficiently perceives and accepts both the trustee’s competency and intention to fulfil the 
expectations of the role, the trustor can decide on a trusting act based on the knowledge of the 
normative expectations tied to the role (Buskens & Raub, 2008). Note that whether an 
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institution is effective in encouraging trusting actions depends on the trustors conviction that 
the institution itself is effective.  
 Taken together, social embeddedness reduces the risk of trust due to learning and 
control opportunities. They also reduce uncertainty by providing familiar foundations in the 
form of institutions, which both actors use to establish a socially shared definition of the 
situation.   
 
3.4.3 Economics of trust – rational choice theory 
Lastly, we have the economic paradigm, or rational choice approach, which focuses on 
developing a formal specification and causal explanation of trust. Here, trust is considered as a 
rational decision actors make, based on evaluations of payoff versus risk in order to determine 
the best way to solve the trust problem, informed by the information, preferences and 
constraints they are dealing with. While economic models of trust seem very clear and precise, 
they do not sufficiently explain why trust sometimes can occur irrationally.   
 The economic approach to trust has been researched extensively (Möllering, 2006a), 
and connects trust to rational choice theory (Gambetta, 1988; Coleman, 1990; Hardin, 2002). 
It allows for a very clear formal representation of complex aspects of trust, and emphasizes the 
aspect of logic behind choices (Kramer, 1999). The basic idea is that actors are rational and 
utility maximizing, who systematically contemplate whether to perform a trusting act, bounded 
and guided by their goals, preferences and incentives.  
 Rational choice theory (RCT) is based on the methodological individualism principle, 
which holds that any social phenomena must be explained and analysed from an individual 
perspective (Coleman, 1990; Rompf, 2014). An example is that social norms can be explained 
as objectively shaping the constraints individuals meet when defining a situation, rather than 
with respect to compliance with third parties (Rompf, 2014). Further, RCT explanations 
construct a model of the situation through an abstraction of the essential aspects of a problem, 
and attempt to establish a causal relationship between the variables. The actions of an individual 
are assumed to be understandable and intentional, with clear, stable preferences that motivate 
behaviour, and in order to understand a social process we have to explain it through the rational 
actions made by individuals (Coleman, 1990).  
 Two elements are characteristic to the rational choice approach to interpersonal trust. 
The first is the trustor’s trust-related knowledge, which is expressed through their expectations, 
and the second is the trustee’s concrete incentives to fulfil the trust content and be trustworthy 
(Hardin, 1993). Expectations are important in the sense that while the preferences and intentions 
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of the trustee are never completely known, the trustor can base an estimate of trustworthiness 
on their various sources of trust-related knowledge. The general idea is that trustees either 
rationally uphold or breach trust depending on the costs and benefits associated with either 
choice (Rompf, 2014).  
 When considering costs and benefits, relevant elements are social embeddedness (which 
can provide incentives), trustee characteristics, as well as potential bias through individual 
disposition and generalized expectations of trust (ibid.). The rational choice perspective 
describes trust decisions as deliberate and laden with effort, where the trustor carefully 
considers any relevant incentives the trustee might draw motivation from, in an effort to avoid 
an outcome of opportunism and exploitation (Möllering, 2006a). 
 
3.5 Interpersonal trust - an integrative framework  
Based on all that’s been said so far in this chapter, trust needs to be considered from multiple 
perspectives. I will utilize the interdisciplinary perspective developed by Rompf in order to try 
to properly integrate all the different aspects of trust. Basically, the subjective experience of 
trust seems to be the primary reason for why definitions of trust in the literature seems to be 
confusingly incompatible (Shapiro, 1987). When defining the concept, different authors focus 
on different phenomenological aspects as well as different sources of trust-related knowledge, 
which leads to theoretical formulations and empirical results being incomparable (McKnight & 
Chervany, 1996). Rompf proposes two elements as the missing link which prevents the 
integration of the different theoretical approaches. The first is interpretation, which is the 
subjective definition of the situation, and the second is the actor’s individual adaptive 
rationality. The issue stems from that researchers are unclear about what role interpretation 
plays in trust problems, and that the rational adaptability of the individual is a fundamental 
dimension of the trust concept. Rompf (2014, p. 378) argues that the idea of dynamic, flexible 
and adaptive degree of rationality constitutes the common ground which makes room for both 
rational and non-rational accounts of trust.  
In order to properly explain adaptive rationality, Rompf (ibid.) focuses on the process 
of both interpretation and the subjective definition of a situation, where information processing 
states function dynamically and adaptively based on the current needs given by the situation as 
well as trust-related knowledge which is activated based on context. In exploring the concept 
of adaptive rationality and trust, he uses the Model of Frame Selection (MFS), which 
conceptualizes trust as the outcome after a process in which frame, script and action are 
selected. Rompf pairs the different steps of selection with adaptive degrees of rationality at each 
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selection, starting with the step of interpretation (selection of frame and script), leading to the 
eventual choice (selection of action). The MFS can functionally relate the determinants of 
information processing, the mode-selections determine to what degree rationality is involved 
in interpretation and choice. This is guided by the trustor’s natural evaluations of motivation 
and opportunity, and informed by the available situational cues which warrant the use of 
existing trust-related knowledge structures.  
 
3.5.1 Adaptive rationality 
In order to properly understand how human rationality can be variable and adaptive, Rompf 
(2014) utilizes the theoretical dual-process paradigm, based on a principal assumption that 
people process information through two different underlying cognitive systems (Kahneman 
2003, Evans 2008).  Basically, individuals can use both cognitive systems and their associated 
information-processing strategies flexibly. Explained generally, humans use two different 
routes or “modes” when processing information which are defined as (1) the “heuristic” 
automatic mode, whose activation is contingent on whether the situation allows for the 
application of readily available simple rules and associations, and (2) the “elaborate” rational 
mode, which requires that the actor has both sufficient levels of motivation and that cognitive 
capacities are available (Rompf, 2014, p. 166). Smith and DeCoster (2000) describe the 
automatic mode as a fast, “rough” approach that humans use to effortlessly and efficiently arrive 
at adequately good answers, and the elaborate mode as a slower approach that involves hard 
thinking and reasoning to solve a problem, resulting in mental operations that require effort.  
Illustrating the activation of the automatic mode, they refer to instances where people use rules 
like “experts are always right” or “the majority is always correct” (ibid., p. 119). If such rules 
are assessed as sufficient to define the situation, the actor does not need to engage in the 
elaborate mode, and heuristically relies on rules when engaging in the situation. Smith and 
DeCoster (2000) claim that the automatic processing mode is what humans use by default, and 
that they will use it unless circumstances contain something out of the ordinary.  
There is considerable agreement on which characteristics define and distinguish the two 
information-processing modes (Kahneman, 2003). When processing in the automatic mode, 
authors agree that it is almost effortless, and that its activation does not enter into the 
individual’s focus of attention. This means that such automatic cognitive processing is not 
intentional or controlled actively by the individual, as the actor relies on simple rules and 
heuristics when interpreting and subjectively defining the situation, as well as when making a 
choice (Rompf, 2014). These rules and heuristics are guided by situational cues that are 
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available, as well as through the actor’s routine application of learned schemata, scripts and 
routines.  
To understand how these modes work, it is necessary to briefly explain how we create 
and store memories. Neuropsychological and psychological evidence indicates that humans 
have evolved and developed two memory systems, due to the need for both slow and fast 
learning (Sherry & Schachter, 1987). The slow-learning memory system is used to form stable 
and general representations of the environment’s “typical properties”, based on experience from 
many trials (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). We can call these representations schematic knowledge 
structures, or simply schemata. Learning in this first memory system occurs as each stimulus 
is processed, “and involves small, incremental alterations of representations in ways that 
facilitate repetition of the same processing” (ibid, p. 170). Basically, the schemata we have 
stored in this system are “updated” when experience in new situations warrant it – we learn 
which stimuli fit with the representation we have, and develop it over time. These stored 
schemata are utilized pre-consciously to both process and interpret new stimuli, by filling in 
incomplete information and categorizing situational cues in the environment (ibid.).   
The fast-learning memory system is able to quickly construct new schemata that can 
connect the different pieces of information about the various aspects of an experience or an 
object in its context (Wiles & Humphreys, 1993). It involves conscious and explicit 
recollections of stored knowledge. The fast-learning system is more concerned with 
irregularities in a situation, stimulus that are unpredicted/unexpected, while the slow-learning 
system is geared towards regularities and “learns” what is typical and expected (Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000). It lets us react when we encounter new information in a new situation, when 
stored knowledge structures cannot adequately be applied. 
Smith and DeCoster (2000) argue that the automatic mode is involved with the slow-
learning memory system and draws information from it in order to form general expectations 
based on typical properties of the environment. The automatic (associative) processing mode 
works by “performing a pattern completion function” (ibid, p. 113), which essentially means 
that the situation is “scanned” for salient cues that fit the stored schemata, and if associative 
retrieval of knowledge is possible and there is a sufficient match, the pattern is “completed” 
which allows for the schemata to be applied successfully in the situation.  
The automatic mode then, can be described as “fast, automatic, effortless, associative, 
and often emotionally charged” (Kahneman, 2003, p. 1451). They are also closely tied to habits, 
and as a result are difficult to control or modify (ibid.), since associated schemata require 
repeated experience in order to change.  When answers are gotten through the automatic mode 
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they seem to just “pop into the head” and become part of the stimulus information in the setting, 
rather than being considered as something the perceiver has evaluated or interpreted on their 
own (Rompf, 2014, p. 170). Such associative retrieval of knowledge through the automatic 
mode can greatly influence the judgments and decisions we make, as they have the potential to 
“colour” how we perceive a situation without us being consciously aware.  
The rational mode of information processing is characterized as being conscious, paying 
select attention to mental content and situational stimuli in the environment (Rompf, 2014). It 
involves an elaborate, explicit and controlled reasoning process, limited in the amount of 
information it can handle simultaneously, and is guided by the individual’s motivations and 
goals. It allows us to have cognitive control when processing information, through the use of 
mechanisms like logical thought, abstraction, planning, inference and decision making 
(Stanovich, 2004).  
The rational mode is related to both memory systems. Schemata stored in the slow 
memory system can be consciously accessed and rationally compared to knowledge of previous 
experiences, which can be used to make judgments and decisions in the situation. The fast 
memory system can be used to rationally connect situational cues together and create a new 
schema “on the spot” (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). An individual can rationally use available 
situational information about a trustee to generate specific expectations of trustworthiness, by 
asking questions like “does he look trustworthy?” or “what incentive does she have to give a 
trustworthy response?” etc. While the rational mode might be able to give more accurate 
answers, the caveat is that it is much slower and costly relative to the automatic mode.  
Kahneman (2003) found that while judgments and decisions are normally intuitive, they 
can be modified or overridden by the rational mode. If the situational cues and information that 
are being processed sufficiently match stored schemata, the automatic mode will activate. The 
rational mode only activates if the situation warrants its intervention to correct or support the 
automatic mode’s operations (Rompf, 2014).  
Such a dual-process approach demonstrates “the notion of human bounded rationality 
as adaptive, highly flexible, and responsive to situational constraints” (Rompf, 2014, p.173). 
Connecting this together with trust, this can be used to understand suspension of doubt, use of 
unconditional or conditional trusting strategies, how institutional trust emerges, and make room 
for accounts of trust as rational choice. As Rompf (2014) puts it: “these aspects can essentially 
be answered in terms of the preferential activation of distinct cognitive systems, their 
information processing state, and the degree of rationality involved in interpretation and the 




When considering determinants of information processing, researchers have put forward a large 
number of variables that could be relevant (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). However, most dual-
processing models agree that (1) opportunity, and (2) motivation are crucial determinants in the 
selection of the automatic or rational mode (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Researchers also 
emphasize (3) the accessibility and applicability of stored knowledge, as well as how well the 
stored knowledge matches situational cues, and finally (4) effort-accuracy trade-offs, which 
involves the efforts and cognitive costs of different processing strategies; this factor is crucial 
in regard to which decision strategies are employed and what degree of rationality is involved 
(Payne et al. 1993; Rompf, 2014).  
 (1) Opportunity involves the cognitive resources of an actor, and how these are limited 
and constrained by situational and individual aspects. Whether a sufficient amount of 
attentional resources or processing time is available helps determine if the actor has the 
opportunity to use the rational mode. Considering the situational dimension of opportunity, if 
the actor finds themselves a situation where a quick behavioural response is necessary, they 
may not have the actual opportunity to utilize the kind of reasoning and reflection the rational 
mode provides, despite the fact that they might otherwise have desired to do so (Fazio, 1990).  
The cognitive capacity and ability of the actor describe the individual-intrinsic 
dimension of opportunity (Kruglanski & Thompson 1999). Cognitive capacity refers to how 
much of a “cognitive load” the actor experiences in the situation, and the amount of attentional 
resources they have available (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 2002). Ability refers to general cognitive 
skills, as well as to what degree actors perceive themselves as effective at processing 
information. Situations where the actor is simultaneously engaging with several different tasks 
increases the cognitive load, which limit the amount of cognitive resources available (Rompf, 
2014). The accessibility and availability of cognitive resources jointly determine the individual-
intrinsic opportunity.  
(2) Motivation concerns the motivation to actually utilize a controlled mode of 
information processing. The situational dimension of motivation has subjective and objective 
aspects; it refers to how the actor subjectively perceives the importance of a task, and the 
responsibility they have for an outcome (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). The objective structure of 
the situation and the stakes involved (what can be gained or lost) are also important in 
determining situational motivation (Payne et al. 1993). If the actor encounters novel cues in the 
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situation or is startled and surprised, this can also increase their situational motivation to use 
more elaborate information processing (Rompf, 2014).  
Individual-intrinsic factors of motivation are need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982), faith in intuition (Epstein et a. 1996) and accuracy-motivation (Petty & Cacioppo 1986). 
These factors are relatively stable personality traits, and influence our general tendency to 
engage in either the rational or automatic mode. Individuals with high levels of faith in their 
intuition tend to use affect to inform most of their decisions, resulting in quick and spontaneous 
decisions, while people who generally prefer to deliberate usually make slower and more 
elaborate decisions based on cognition (Schunk & Betsch, 2006).  
Goals and expectations influence motivation. When a desired outcome or goal suggests 
that systematic reasoning should be used, or when a systematic analysis is promoted by 
expectations, this can lead to processing in the rational mode (Fiske, 1993; Bargh et al., 2001; 
Molden & Higgins, 2005). If situational goals do not require accurate decisions they can lessen 
the need to undergo controlled reasoning and promote the use of the automatic mode.  
 (3) Accessibility and Applicability: Accessibility concerns how accessible particular 
knowledge is, how much effort is required to bring it to mind. It depends on the characteristics 
of the cognitive mechanisms that produce particular thoughts as well as those of the situational 
stimuli that elicit it (Kahneman, 2003). Higgins (1996) defined accessibility as the activation 
potential of available knowledge; the more accessible any particular information is, the more 
likely it is employed to categorize stimulus information. While accessible knowledge always 
has some potential to be activated, it exists in a somewhat dormant state until activated. This 
means that the most accessible knowledge in a given moment shape interpretation, the 
subjective definition of the situation, and decision-making. The temporary accessibility of 
stored knowledge can be increased through situational cues in the environment that promote its 
activation; this means that the knowledge comes to mind more easily, and are used when 
processing information. Chronic accessibility of knowledge means whether knowledge is 
accessible on more of a general basis and can be used independently of context (Schwarz, 
2009).  
The applicability of stored knowledge concerns whether it can be applied to understand 
the information that is perceived (Higgins, 1996). If stored knowledge cannot help us master a 
situation the situation is likely to appear problematic and warrant an elaborate and systematic 
analysis in order to properly understand the situation and consider how to approach/deal with 
it. The higher the match between stored knowledge and situational features, the more likely it 
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is to be activated to understand the situation. If stored knowledge is both highly accessible and 
matches the situational features, that promotes the activation of the automatic processing mode.  
 (4) Effort-accuracy Trade-offs: The different processing modes and decision strategies 
are assumed to involve different amounts of mental effort (Rompf, 2014). This results in a 
trade-off evaluation between the expected necessary effort and the amount of accuracy involved 
in using the different decision strategies. Rational decision strategies require a tremendous 
amount of cognitive resources in order to systematically retrieve knowledge from memory, 
compare alternatives and scrutinize situational cues, but can provide a high level of accuracy 
(Payne et al., 1993). Heuristic automatic strategies are usually less accurate, but incur far less 
cognitive costs, while random choices are the least costly and accurate.  
 Summarizing, both opportunity and motivation are necessary in order to select the 
rational mode (Chaiken, 1980; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). If either of the conditions are missing, 
the use of the rational mode is either not feasible or required. The higher the costs of a decision 
strategy, the higher the accuracy and vice versa. Individuals try to balance out the cognitive 
costs needed in order to sufficiently satisfy their motivational concerns in a situation (Chen & 
Chaiken, 1999). The accessibility and applicability of knowledge is also an important 
determinant. In the automatic mode, individuals process information by relying on the stored 
knowledge that is most accessible; however, in order for the automatic mode to be activated 
there also needs to be a sufficient match between stored knowledge and situational cues. If there 
is a mismatch, motivation to use the rational system increases as long as conditions of 
opportunity and motivation are met (Fiske et al., 1999).  
 In terms of interpersonal trust, dual-processing models are valuable as adaptive 
rationality is demonstrated to be an essential feature of human interaction, which can be taken 
to mean that it’s fundamental as a dimension of trust itself (Rompf, 2014). It can be presumed 
to be involved in every decision of a trusting act as well as part of every solution to a trust 
problem (ibid.). Adaptive rationality allows us to understand and explain the different types of 
trust which seem conflicting, such as calculus-based vs. affect-based trust. However, the actual 
link between cognition and action has not been formally established in the models of dual-
processing, meaning we cannot discern the actual rules of selection related to the definition of 
the situation, scripts and actions (Mayerl, 2010). Also, while dual-processing models include 
the importance of context, they don’t incorporate the fact that there is always a socially pre-
structured environment from which perception and choice draw information from. 
Symbolically structured and socially defined situations are important to action in general and 
for interpersonal trust to be established in particular (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Jones & George, 
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1998). In order to properly understand the social phenomenon of interpersonal trust, the 
objective social definition of the situation needs to be included as an important variable as well, 
while still accounting for the importance of adaptive rationality in regard to interpretation and 
choice (Rompf, 2014).  
 
3.5.2 Model of Frame Selection 
The starting point of this model is the idea of a definition and framing of a situation, explaining 
how an individual defines a situation as a fundamental condition for which actions they have 
available and are willing to perform (Kroneberg, 2006). It builds upon the Thomas theorem: “if 
[humans] define a situation as real, it is real in their consequences.” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, 
p. 572). Action is grounded the subjective beliefs of an actor, and these actions become part of 
a social reality, despite their possible lack of objective truth. It includes the idea that actors use 
mental schemata in order to reduce a situation’s complexity through categorizing its situational 
cues into a meaningful whole, abstracting from some cues as being irrelevant (Kroneberg, 2006, 
p. 4). The mental schemata contain situationally relevant knowledge structures which in the 
case of interpersonal trust could include specific and generalized expectations, social norms, 
expectations tied to a role, relational schemata tied to a significant other etc. (Rompf, 2014). 
An actor’s perspective of a particular situation is structured by the totality of activated mental 
schemata.  As a given situation can be interpreted by an individual in many different ways, the 
term frame selection refers to the process of activating a specific frame (Kroneberg, 2006).  
Mental schemata can be separated into two classes: frames and scripts (Rompf, 2014). 
Frames are mental models of typical situations, referring to socially shared interpretive 
schemes. These help us understand what kind of situation we find ourselves in, and are usually 
learned and internalized during socialization in a social or cultural context (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966). A subjective definition of a situation through the activation of a frame 
defines the relevant main goals, and certain “programs of behaviour” are activated. These are 
the frame’s associated scripts, containing knowledge of typical sequences of action in typical 
situations, and involve different kinds of behaviour, values, routines and affective states 
(Rompf, 2014). Because scripts will always be tied specifically to certain situations, the 
activation of a script happens after a situation has been defined and framed, i.e. a process of 
frame selection has taken place. The process through which scripts are selected is referred to as 
script selection (Kroneberg, 2006).  
Through the activation of frames and scripts, the set of available meaningful sequences 
of action are limited, simplifying our interpretation process of a situation. Since frames belong 
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to stored associative knowledge structures and the slow-learning memory system, they are tied 
to certain situational objects that indicate and signal the appropriateness of a frame in a 
particular situation (Kroneberg, 2006; Rompf, 2014). Since situational objects contain a 
socially constructed meaning they are susceptible to change, i.e. through negotiations of 
meaning (Wimmer, 2002). Frames can be activated in many different ways, such as through 
conversation or the manners of how an individual is acting. An example is the hospital frame 
which can contain situational objects such as uniforms and behaviours. Frame and script 
selection typically follows a “logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 1989), meaning that 
actors are primarily motivated with decoding situations they find themselves in most accurately 
and appropriately (Rompf, 2014).  
After the frame and script selection, the actor is in a position to consider what course of 
action to take; this leads to an action selection (Kroneberg, 2006). The action selection is what 
rational choice theories usually focus on, which only considers what an individual actually 
overtly does in a situation, and not necessarily how they reached that decision (ibid.). By taking 
into account the selections of frames and scripts, the MFS accounts for the importance of the 
subjective definition of the situation. Since the activation of frames and scripts narrow down 
the possible courses of actions in a situation due to forming the preferences and influencing 
expectancy-formation, the actual choice of action is shaped significantly by the prior processes 
of interpretation and activation of mental schemata.  
All three selections can occur with varying degrees of rationality, meaning in both the 
automatic or rational modes. Automatic mode selections spring out of the temporary 
accessibility of mental models (Rompf, 2014). Referring back to Smith and DeCoster’s (2000) 
description of the automatic mode as pattern-completion, the automatic mode is used if a pattern 
can be “completed” without any irregularities and stored knowledge can be routinely executed. 
The activation weights of schemata is based on how well particular schemata match a 
situation and how accessible they are in relation to situational cues and their activation of 
associative knowledge (ibid.). If we encounter situational cues we can understand intuitively, 
we will interpret the situation using the most accessible frame, activating the most accessible 
script, and executing the most accessible course of action, as determined through the selected 
frame and script (ibid, p. 201). This automatic mode selection-sequence occurs without any 
deliberate effort or conscious thought.  
 
Automatic mode selections 
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What are the determinants that influence the activation weight of schemata? An automatic mode 
frame selection is completely determined by the actor’s immediate experience of a match 
between the frames and the given situation. The match of a frame is a function of (1) the mental 
accessibility of the frame, (2) the presence of situational objects which are significant to the 
frame and (3) how strong the associative link is between the frame and objects (Kroneberg, 
2006).  
The mental accessibility of the frame can be understood as its chronic accessibility 
(Rompf, 2014), referring to an actor’s general disposition to understand situations in a particular 
manner; it relates directly to socialization, learning and experience, and is generally fairly 
stable. Present situational objects function as heuristic cues, used to determine both the 
appropriateness and validity of the frame – it allows the model to include objective-situational 
variance and show the influence of context on activation weights (ibid.). The associative link 
refers to how strongly the situational cues are tied to a specific frame and carry symbolic 
meaning of the situation to the actor, describing the associative strength between a situational 
object and frame.  
If a frame is selected automatically, the frame that best matches the current situation is 
selected. A general inference that can be made from this is that the more familiar the situation 
is, the higher the match and activation weights will be (Rompf, 2014). A complete match 
between frame and situation means that the situational cues can easily be understood by using 
available knowledge. A low match indicates that the actor is confronted with an unfamiliar 
situation, which cannot be mastered by the application of routine knowledge. In unfamiliar 
situations, the frame has a low chronic accessibility and/or the associative strength between the 
frame and situational cues is weak. This means situational cues cannot be properly decoded 
even if they are objectively present (ibid.). If a situation is filled with ambiguity where 
situational cues cannot unambiguously indicate a specific meaning, then the match is low even 
if chronic accessibility is high and there is a strong associative link between the frames and 
situational objects. 
The activation weight of scripts is also dependant on several related elements 
(Kroneberg, 2006). The chronic accessibility of the script represents the strength of its mental 
anchoring, such as to what degree certain norms are internalized or the actor is used to particular 
routines. A highly internalized norm can easily be retrieved as a script which can guide action, 
as it is chronically accessible to the individual.  
The temporary accessibility of a script has two sources which situationally influence the 
script activation (Rompf, 2014). It is dependent upon the associative strength between the 
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already selected frame and script – once the situation has been framed in a particular manner, 
that definition will result in certain knowledge structures becoming either more or less 
accessible. It’s also influenced by the presence of situational objects, which can indicate certain 
actions as more appropriate.  
Lastly, the match between the activated frame and the script. As the accessibility of a 
script implies, depending on the kind of situation certain actions are more or less expected 
(Kroneberg 2006). One can then make the assumption that the activation of a script is 
completely dependent upon how the frame was selected, as the frame defined what kind of 
situation the actor is in. The clearer the definition of the situation through a script, the more 
likely a script related to the frame will be activated. If a situation is very familiar to an 
individual, they are more certain about their interpretation of the situation being valid, leading 
to them being more confident about the relevant possible courses of action in the situation.  
Summarized, automatic mode script selections depend on the experienced match, which 
involves how the frame was defined in regard to the amount of ambiguity.  The script also needs 
to be associated with a certain frame which indicates its appropriateness, and the script needs 
to be chronically accessible in the memory of the actor.  
The action selection in the automatic mode happens in a situation which has already 
been defined according to a frame and where a script has been subsequently activated. For an 
automatic action to be possible, the selected script needs to sufficiently regulate the course of 
action. While scripts contain information and knowledge about what actions are considered 
typical and which behaviours are expected in well-known situations, they tend to be open to 
interpretation and are not necessarily detailed enough to allow for an unambiguous selection of 
one specific action from a set of possible alternatives (Rompf, 2014). This means that the 
activation weight is dependent on how strictly the script regulates action. Rompf illustrates this 
by comparing the relatively open “restaurant” script (what type of behaviour is expected in a 
restaurant) to the rule-based social norm “do not lie”, which is a script that highly regulates 
action (ibid., p. 204). A second aspect that determines the activation weight of an action is the 
script’s overall activation level; if there is uncertainty in the actor’s mind concerning a scripts 
appropriateness, then it is unlikely that they will respond with an automatic behaviour based on 
routine. This will be the case even if action is highly regulated by the script, as the actor is not 
sure whether the script should be applied to the current situation.  In other words, in order for 
an action to be selected routinely, the situation must have an unambiguous subjective definition 
while the action is also highly regulated by a script.  
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Rational mode selection of frame, script and action 
The logic that informs the selection rules of schemata in the rational mode is not quite the same 
as in the automatic mode. Selections in the rational mode are characterized by comparison, 
evaluation, effort and a deliberative reasoning processes (Rompf, 2014). However, as selections 
are motivated by the actor’s intent to appropriately identify the correct alternatives given the 
circumstances of the situation, selections in this mode do also follow a “logic of 
appropriateness.” Selections in the rational mode resemble choices as defined in rational choice 
theory (Coleman, 1990); from this perspective, behaviour and choice are viewed as purposive 
action rooted in subjectively rational considerations, and involves an understanding of actors’ 
primary motivations and purposes for making a choice as being grounded in a maximization of 
utility (Kroneberg, 2006). 
When considering whether a frame is appropriate or not, the actor is mainly concerned 
with determining whether or not they are acceptable given the situation – actors attempt to 
systematically analyse the situation as well as identify the objectively matching frame through 
a process of reasoning (Kroneberg, 2006). Actors form expectations about whether a frame is 
appropriate, an appropriateness belief, which corresponds closely to the match of the activated 
frame described in the automatic mode. The difference is that the match is both experienced 
and perceived as an expectation, rather than a routine, unconscious definition of the situation 
(ibid.). An important note is that all the elements which can determine a match in the automatic 
mode have the potential to become problematic when selecting a frame in the rational mode, 
and thus be scrutinized and undergo an elaborate reasoning process in order to determine their 
appropriateness (Rompf, 2014). To rationally select a frame, actors consciously evaluate how 
the situational cues fit available knowledge structures, and as a result consider (1) the 
importance of relevant situational objects present in the environment, (2) their significance in 
regard to a specific frame, and (3) how appropriate the particular interpretation is, given the 
situation. The utility attached to the different possible frames is derived from the utility the 
actor gains from forming an appropriate perspective of the world, and this is why a rational 
utility-maximizing actor might be motivated to properly frame a situation (ibid.).  
The appropriateness belief of a frame becomes a decisive factor for an actor when 
rationally defining a situation, as it is indicative of the subjective expected utility in a situation. 
Continuing to scripts then, how does an actor determine which behaviour is the most 
appropriate after they have defined the situation they find themselves in? Construction of the 
appropriateness belief of a script is similar to the corresponding factor for frames: the actor 
considers whether situational cues are available which are significant for a particular script, and 
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also whether a script is appropriate given the selected frame. The subjective expected utility 
plays a role here as well, as a correctly selected script (which thus is appropriate) will yield the 
best options for behaviour and action in the situation. 
Finally, actually selecting an action in the rational mode involves the available 
alternatives of behaviour and action being consciously and elaborately evaluated in regard to 
costs, expectations and benefits (Rompf, 2014). Taken together, it becomes apparent that the 
actual selection of actions becomes structured by the preceding selections of frame and script, 
and this is true both for automatic and rational selections. Specific knowledge structures are 
activated by the frame and script in the form of primary goals, values, affective states and 
sequences of action and the like, which directly influence expectations and utility. After 
activating, frames and scripts limit the alternative choices that can be considered, which means 
that they help determine the preferences and individual goal structure of the individual (ibid., 
p. 206).   
The selection rules outlined in the MFS causally connects interpretation and choice in 
both the automatic and rational mode. It utilizes the valuable insights the dual-processing 
paradigm provides, while also incorporating the framework of rational choice theory. The 
model can be used to help explain how we can sometimes see unconditional normative routine 
in human action, contradicting standard rational choice theory (Rompf, 2014). We can both 
understand and explain unconditional norm compliance through automatic activation of 
schemata and the routine execution of scripts. Conversely, if something interrupts our initial 
interpretation of the situation, or if actions are not sufficiently regulated by scrips, the rational 
mode is activated where actors perform operations in order to maximize utility. The model can 
be used to explain how culture shapes preferences (Fehr & Hoff, 2011), and point to the 
significance of a socialized stock of cultural knowledge concerning typical situations and 
typical programs of behaviour in relation to individual interpretation and choice (Rompf, 2014). 
Selections that resemble pure rational choice can be understood as a case where either no 
intuitive frames are accessible, the situation is interpreted as unfamiliar and important, or when 
there is sufficient motivation on the part of the actor to override automatic categorizations of 
information.  
 
3.5.3 Definition - trust and adaptive rationality 
If we consider the different forms of trust put forward in the literature, such as calculus-based, 
affect-based and conditional trust, rule-based and institution-based trust, the primary difference 
between them is the amount of involved rationality (Rompf, 2014). This means that adaptive 
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rationality is a major component of the trust concept, and that adaptive rationality, individual 
processing states and their underlying mechanisms are necessary in order to understand trust. 
By incorporating this perspective, we can understand cases of conditional forms of trust, in 
which the trustor deals with the trust problem subjectively and contemplates what decision to 
make, and unconditional forms of trust, where the trustor trusts without doubt or any conscious 
elaboration (ibid.). We can also explain the interplay between the different types of trust, such 
as the how social norms and roles work together with trust built in a dyad relationship over 
time. As such, Rompf’s definition of trust, which I will also use, is as follows: 
 
 “[Trust is] an actor’s definition of the situation that involves the activation of mental 
schemata sufficient for the generation of a favorable expectation of trustworthiness and the 
subsequent conditional or unconditional choice of a trusting act.” – Rompf (2014, p. 380). 
 
While it is a very general definition, it combines both the psychological and sociological 
dimensions of trust with the behavioural dimension of choice and action (ibid.) It does not 
actually demand a specific processing state or directly specify the content of trust-related 
knowledge. But as Rompf notes, it is impossible to specify a closed set containing “all-
encompassing types of trust” (ibid., p. 380). The definition does however allow for us to 
causally trace the choice of a trusting act back to both rational and automatic means of 
processing. This can for example be a rational assessment of trustee characteristics or a 
consideration of effort versus value, or the automatic routine use of trust-related knowledge 
such as relational schemata, norms and roles. Unconditional cases of trust can be understood as 
building on the person’s specific learning history and socialization, and occurs already at the 
level of mode selection (ibid.). Expectations of trustworthiness are only rationally accessed in 
conditional trust – here, the specific situation decides whether trust-related knowledge is 









4.1 The adolescent’s definition of the situation 
Let’s begin by tying this framework of trust to the adolescent’s lives. As previously mentioned, 
many children within child welfare have experienced challenging experiences and relationships 
with adults and with the child welfare system (Kayed et al., 2015). Using our understanding of 
trust and adaptive rationality, we can see how such previous experiences can become stored 
knowledge and schemata for the adolescents through processes of socialization and learning 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Rumelhart, 1980; Rompf, 2014). This influences how they 
interpret and act in future situations that are assessed as being sufficiently similar, forming 
general expectations of trustworthiness (Rotter, 1980; Baldwin, 1992).  
If we consider that an adolescent has had mostly negative interactions with adults 
throughout their lives, this can lead to them subjectively defining situations with all adults in a 
way where trust is unlikely to occur. After framing the situation, the most appropriate script is 
likely to be selected, based on the match between stored knowledge and available situational 
cues (Kroneberg, 2006). In our current example, if nothing indicates that there is something out 
of the ordinary with the situation (follows a pattern of previous negative interactions with 
adults), then the most appropriate scripts are probably going to contain action sets that make 
trust unlikely. In an extreme case, a script’s contained actions might not involve any opportunity 
to trust at all, as they have already been ruled out by the selection of the script (Kroneberg, 
2006). One way to create opportunities for trust then, is by providing situational cues and 
experiences which signal that trust is a possibility.  
McFerran (2010) noted that since adolescents are quick to judge whether an adult is 
trustworthy (indicative of an automatic selection frame and script), it is important for the music 
therapist to be clear, consistent and authentic in order to initially appear trustworthy. This is 
also reflected in comments from adolescents participating in a music therapy workshop, where 
available adults represented stability, continuity and a break from life in child welfare 
institutions (Krüger et al., 2014). We can interpret this as a means to reduce social uncertainty 
for the adolescent, and signalling trustworthy characteristics. As previously argued, 
benevolence, competence, integrity and predictability are important to perceived 
trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995), and emphasizing these might prevent adolescents from 
automatically defining a situation as distrustful. McFerran’s (2010) point of being authentic and 
consistent can be connected to predictability, since the adolescent can more easily perceive and 
asses the music therapist’s personality and characteristics if they act in a clear and authentic 
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manner, and so be able to more accurately predict future behaviour. This can potentially 
strengthen the perceived integrity of the music therapist, which can be used to create 
expectations of future trustworthiness. McFerran (ibid.) also mentions the importance of 
genuinely listening to the adolescent, which we can relate to Skjervheim’s (1996) definition of 
“being taken seriously” and to giving importance to the child’s voice (Krüger & Stige, 2015). 
If the music therapist is successful in genuinely listening to the adolescent, this can build up 
their perceived benevolence (how much the trustee cares about the trustor’s welfare), as the 
adolescent feels that the music therapist is acknowledging their point of view and trying to 
understand them. A suggestion here is that one can start small where stakes aren’t too high, 
such as with simple getting-to-know-each-other activities (Strandbu et al., 2016). Starting with 
small and less demanding experiences of successful trust can potentially later develop into more 
mature, meaningful trust relations (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Activities can also be an 
opportunity for the music therapist to demonstrate their competence, that they for example can 
be trusted to competently lead/support a group discussion or teach a musical instrument.  
 
4.2 Music therapy and roles 
We can also consider the impact of the different roles of the music therapist. Krüger (2012) 
noted that when interviewing adolescents that he had previously worked with in a music 
workshop, it was commented on how he used a different “language” in his research role, that 
he spoke differently and more formally to the adolescent than usual. When Krüger asked how 
he should speak, the adolescent answered that he should “just be himself” (ibid., p. 54). This 
emphasizes McFerran’s (2010) point of presenting oneself as clear, authentic and consistent; 
by appearing or behaving different, it can be argued that some degree of social uncertainty 
entered into the situation. In Krüger’s example, this was quickly resolved as their already-
established trust relationship made it possible to comment on and discuss the discrepancy.  
Because music therapists can be symbolic of many different roles, this might provide 
different opportunities. The music therapist can for example be perceived as a health 
professional, musician, teacher, mentor, adult, coach, friend etc. Since different roles contain 
different meanings, certain roles might appear more trustworthy than others (Rompf, 2014). 
While interaction with someone who the adolescent associates with the role of “child welfare 
worker” can be unfavourable to trust opportunities due to negative past experiences, 
interactions with a “musician role” might represent something new, potentially preventing an 
automatic distrusting interpretation and judging of the situation. The adolescent might associate 
the musician role with certain values that are in line with their musical and recreational interests, 
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possibly motivating them to be open to trust (Hardin, 2003). By opening up for interactions, 
communication and dialogue can occur, in which meanings and opinions can be shared and the 
actors can get better acquainted. This can provide opportunities to reduce social distance 
(Hoffman et al., 2008) develop shared mental schemata and specific expectations of 
trustworthiness.  
Recall the music therapist’s role as a potential “mesoagent” (Mandal & Bergset, 2016). 
For this to be possible, a trusting relationship needs to be established between the adolescent 
and music therapist, providing the adolescent with a sense of confidence and security (Burke 
& Stets, 1999). This relationship can be used to improve the overall connectedness between the 
adolescent’s different networks; being situated in several of the different systems surrounding 
the adolescent, the music therapist themselves might be considered as a situational cue the 
adolescent can draw confidence from, which  can promote interactions of trust with others. The 
presence of the music therapist in the situation can lead to the selection of trust-promoting 
frames, scripts and actions in interactions with others in the situation, opening up for 
communication and dialogue which can establish or re-negotiate relationships both between the 
adolescent and different parts of their network, and between the different parts themselves.   
The music therapy workshop with peers can also provide adolescents with a different 
“atmosphere” than usual, where they feel more relaxed and able to be themselves (Krüger et 
al., 2014). The adolescents are allowed to feel sad without having to explain why; instead of 
being probed with questions about how they feel and pushed to do something in order to feel 
better, the adolescents can just be accepted as they are, countering the common normative 
pressure to always be happy and strive for perfection. This involves treating the adolescents as 
equals characterized by trust and acceptance. They can be trusted to bring up things if they want 
to, indicating that they are being taken seriously and maintaining a power balance between the 
adults and adolescents in the setting. This leads to the development of schemata and scripts 
related to a notion that it is “okay to be who you are”, based on experiences that let you trust 
that who you are is good enough and valuable in social interactions.   
 
4.3 Musical activities, objects and trust 
The importance of musical objects as a source of trust has already been hinted at. Mandal and 
Bergset (2016) mentioned that music can be useful in emotion-regulation, and that written 
songs can be used as containers for difficult experiences and feelings. The song-writing activity 
can be interpreted as a setting where norms and values make sharing and expressing thoughts 
easier, because we encounter music in our everyday lives that commonly contain stories or 
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descriptions, meaning that we are used to them carrying such information. It feels appropriate 
and ordinary to write song lyrics related to stories and experiences, because it is so typical in 
musical culture (Ruud, 1997). This doesn’t mean that is necessarily easy to write songs. But 
such norms and values inherent in songs and song-writing can be a starting point for developing 
a relationship with the music therapist, assuming that the adolescent is motivated and interested 
in actually writing a song.  
If repeated experiences of song-writing with the music therapist are successful, this 
leads to the development of new schemata related to the belief that songs are appropriate for 
expressing and regulating thoughts and feelings, and the development of specific relational 
schemata with the music therapist that favour expectations of trustworthiness. This is because 
through repeated interaction the actors can get to know one another and create specific 
knowledge structures containing information about the others’ trustworthiness (Endress, 2002). 
This also relates to Kenny’s (1989) “field of play”, in which shared musical experiences can 
result in trust; the musical framing of the situation can make different actions and means of 
communication available (Rompf, 2014), and create a setting where a dialogue between the 
actors’ musical identities can build trust.   
The musical objects, which can also be instruments, can be used as something the 
adolescent can trust and use as support in interactions with others. They can symbolize 
something familiar in the situation, which can be used to reduce social uncertainty (Rompf, 
2014). For example, by orientating the music therapy session around a guitar, the adolescent 
and music therapist interact specifically around the guitar as a topic. This provides a 
predictability in the content of the social interaction and trust relation, where meanings can be 
negotiated and explored, rooted in the guitar. For instance, the dyad can discuss how they each 
find the instrument important and interesting to them, as equal individuals who both invest 
personal resources in the relationship rather than a one-way therapist-client interaction where 
the therapist “knows” why the instrument should be important to the adolescent and tries to 
explain the meaning in the adolescent’s relationship with the guitar. The instrument can be used 
as a setting where the actors’ values and personalities can meet in dialogue and constitute the 
beginnings of a relational bond. As the sessions develop, the actors might start playing together 
and explore the dynamics of their particular relationship and musicalities. As such, their dyadic 
embeddedness situated around the guitar can be used to form and stabilize specific expectations 
regarding each other and promote the development of relational schemata and mutual 
attachment (Endress, 2002). The “guitar” in the above example can just as well be replaced 
with specific songs, or even non-musical interests.  
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4.4 Trust in redefining power structures 
Concrete musical objects and settings can contain meaning which the adolescents can use as a 
resource in several ways (Ruud, 2013; Strandbu et al., 2016; Smetana, 2017). The musical 
objects or setting and their meaning can be shared and conveyed to others, such as in the 
performance of the music theatre (Strandbu et al., 2016), and be used to bridge networks, build 
relationships and develop identities challenge power structures. In the example of the music 
theatre, the adults and adolescents come together to create a collaboratively defined collective, 
in which the institutional structures are developed together. This means that the adolescents 
have power and can use their voice in dialogue with the other participants to help shape the 
setting to their needs and interests by collectively determining the goals, rules and social norms 
of the group. As these developed schemata of the music theatre are shared by participants, these 
institutional structures can be relied on when choosing to trust in the music theatre (Luhmann, 
1979; Lindenberg, 1992). The participants can reach agreements on what is needed in order to 
reach the group’s goals, and help motivate each other to act according to the agreements, which 
helps maintain the validity of the institutional structures and make institutional trust feasible. 
As the group and its structures (the schemata) become more familiar and known to the 
participants, trust has the potential to be routinely executed (Schütz & Luckmann, 1973). In 
other words, the participants have developed shared frames and scripts by socializing in the 
same setting, which involve shared values and goals. This can lead to the situation being defined 
as one where knowledge structures involving trust are easily accessible, and therefore are likely 
to be used to categorize situational cues in the setting (Higgins, 1996). This works mutually 
alongside the relational trust the participants can build towards one another through group 
interactions (Rompf, 2014). As the relationships develop through repeated interactions over 
time, the participants can move towards more affect- and identification-based trust (Lewicki et 
al. 2006).  
 Music therapy can also include actors from other parts of the adolescents’ social 
network, such as relatives, friends and child welfare workers. As described earlier, these are 
actors that adolescents in child welfare sometimes experience difficult relationships with 
(Krüger 2012; Kayed et al. 2015). By inviting them to participate in the musical context, 
interactions between the actors can be framed differently than usual, rooted in the schemata 
related to the music therapy setting. This allows for strong trust relationships to increase their 
relationship bandwidth and richness (Lewicki et al., 1998), while strained relationships between 
actors can have a chance to be re-negotiated in a setting with new situational components that 
can potentially foster trust. If verbal communication has been challenging, a communication 
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through musical elements can allow for interests and experiences to be shared in a new light, 
potentially developing deeper understanding between the actors and laying the groundwork for 
trust to be built, as the actors can gain more knowledge about each other. If interactions are 
successful in the context of music therapy, this can help create new expectations of 
trustworthiness in regard to the other actors, which can be utilized to develop the relationship 
between the actors in different contexts (Rompf, 2014).  
 Similar to the generalized expectation proposed earlier where “all adults in the child 
welfare systems are untrustworthy based on previous experience”, we can assume that an 
opposite expectation can be true as well. if the music therapy is part of a child welfare measure, 
we can consider that it can help build trust in the child welfare system. Positive experiences of 
trust in the music therapy setting has the potential to give the adolescents new stored knowledge 
regarding adults in the child welfare system. This can start with the music therapist, and extend 
to other adults which can be invited to take part in the music therapy in some manner, e.g. as 
equal participants or audience members. In the example of the music theatre, the presence of 
child welfare workers and other adults in the audience can symbolize a willingness to listen to 
and acknowledge the adolescent’s voice, and an attempt to understand their life experiences. 
These might be sides of the adults which the adolescents have not subjectively experienced 
before, and can be indicative of their trustworthiness; “They do actually make an effort to 
understand me, they’ve come to listen to me and my performance!”. Power can be shifted, 
where the adolescents are in the spotlight and share important messages to the child welfare 
workers. If the adults then follow-up on the adolescents expressed thoughts and feelings, engage 
in dialogue and take their perspective seriously, this can be used as a starting point to develop 
positive, respectful trust relations with new opportunities for relating.  
 
4.5 Implications of understanding trust 
Developing insights into how trust concretely can be built and relied on as a resource can help 
determine how to best use music therapy with the specific adolescent, and increase the 
likelihood of achieving goals. As trust can lead to openness, the adolescents might feel more 
comfortable sharing their voice, promoting dialogue. A deeper understanding of how musical 
objects can be a resource for trust can be useful for the adolescents outside of the music therapy 
sessions. Understanding trust can also promote opportunities to trust relationships with 
significant others’ in the adolescents lives. It seems necessary however, for further research to 
actually ask adolescents about trust, and include them in defining the values of trust, since 
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general theorising can only go so far (Follesø, 2006) and, as I have argued, it is important for 
the child’s voice to be heard.  
I need to emphasize that trust does not equal participation in music therapy. Music 
therapy isn’t always interesting or necessary for the adolescent, and the aim of music therapy 
should not be to build trust in order to keep the adolescents in therapy for an indefinite amount 
of time. It is important to help them realize their own strengths and resources and be able to 
navigate their own lives with confidence. And so, it is important for the music therapist to trust 
the adolescents, in that they know best when to leave therapy, for whatever reason. If a strong, 
trusting relationship has been developed then hopefully it will be possible to speak more openly 

































This thesis has explored trust in music therapy in child welfare, and presented a broad 
theoretical framework of trust as a means to do this. I have argued that trust can be built and 
used as a resource in many different ways, with implications to both the music therapy itself 
and the adolescents lives outside of music therapy. To conclude, I’ll begin by revisiting the 
research questions and see how these can be answered based on the insights above. 
 
1) How has trust been understood in music therapy with adolescents? 
The music therapy literature presented has considered trust as a necessary component of music 
therapy, but has not necessarily explained how trust is concretely built. The importance of a 
trust relationship with the music therapist has been related to opening up possibilities for 
activities and interaction. Musical activities have been considered as a unique setting to build 
trust and interact with one another. It has also been argued that musical objects in themselves 
can provide a basis for trust, which the adolescents can use as a resource in social interactions 
and in dealing with difficult experiences.  
 The literature suggests that a clear, consistent and authentic presentation of the music 
therapist is conducive to building trust. It can give the impression of predictability and that the 
adolescents are taken seriously and genuinely listening to, promoting expectations of 
trustworthiness. 
 
2) How can trust as a mental phenomenon broadly be understood? 
Trust as a mental phenomenon can broadly be understood as multidisciplinary, with 
psychological, sociological and economic dimensions. By focusing on understanding the 
influence of interpretation and considering adaptive rationality a fundamental dimension of the 
trust concept, different types of trust from the research traditions can be understood and causally 
explained. In order to do this, the following definition of trust was used: 
 
“Trust is an actor’s definition of the situation that involves the activation of mental 
schemata sufficient for the generation of a favorable expectation of trustworthiness and the 
subsequent conditional or unconditional choice of a trusting act.” (Rompf, 2014, p. 380) 
Mental schemata are knowledge structures that contain past experiences of socialization and 
learning, which help the actor interpret, define and act in a situation. These can be applied 
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automatically if the situational cues match the stored knowledge, but may need to be considered 
rationally if the situation is unfamiliar and contains something the actor isn’t used to.  
3) How can trust be built in music therapy in Norwegian child welfare?  
One way trust can be built in music therapy in child welfare through repeated collaborative 
interactions in a musical setting, where the actors are considered as equals and their voice and 
perspectives are respected and participation promoted. It is important that the music therapist 
is clear, consistent and authentic, as it provides adolescents with a sense of predictability that 
can be used as a starting point for a trust relation. Music therapy can provide situational cues 
relevant to knowledge structures associated with trust, such as by focusing on a shared interest 
in musical objects or providing unambiguous courses of action such as practicing instruments, 
reducing social uncertainty. In groups, trust can be built by the participants collaboratively 
deciding the institutional structure of the group, creating shared schemata related to group goals, 
values, roles and social norms. Institutional trust can be used as a starting point to develop 
trusting relational schema based on repeated interactions and shared interests, potentially 
leading to affect and identification-based trust. By inviting people from other parts of the 
adolescents’ networks to take part in the music therapy, the musical setting can function as a 
new arena for the development of the trust relations between them. The context can influence 
how the actors interpret the social interaction, and help prevent automatic distrustful 
interpretations and judgments. By opening up for communication and dialogue, power-
structures can be disputed, and create new trust opportunities with adults the adolescents have 
previously tended to distrust.  
 
Study limitations  
This thesis has only focused on a limited part of specific theoretical perspectives to music 
therapy with adolescents, meaning the findings are relatively specific and thus its validity in 
other approaches is unclear. Further, the selected literature and how it has been interpreted can 
be considered to have been influenced by my preunderstanding, meaning that other authors 
exploring the topic might reach different conclusions. My decision to use a broad, universal 
framework of the mental phenomena of trust can also be criticized, as I could have opted to 
define it more specifically following disciplinary borders which might have made it easier to 
understand specific points. Nevertheless, my hope is that by using such a definition the findings 
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